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ABSTRACT
Anyone can buy stock in a public company, but not all shareholders are equally committed
to a company’s long-term success. In an increasingly fragmented financial world, shareholders’
attitudes toward the companies in which they invest vary widely, from time horizon to conviction.
Faced with indexers, short-term traders, and activists, it is more important than ever for businesses
to ensure that their shareholders are dedicated to their missions. Today’s companies need “quality
shareholders,” as Warren Buffett called those who “load up and stick around,” or buy large stakes
and hold for long periods.
While scholars in recent years have extensively debated indexers, short-term traders, and
activists, they have paid scant attention to quality shareholders and their critical role in corporate
finance and governance. This Article corrects this oversight by highlighting the quality
shareholder cohort. Adding this fresh perspective confirms some of the angst about myopic shorttermism on the one hand and ignorant indexing on the other, but rather than regulate related
behaviors, the fresh perspective invites attention to empowering quality shareholders. In
particular, rather than taxing short-term shareholders or passing through indexer voting rights,
this Article explains how companies could simply increase the voting power of their quality
shareholders.
*****
This Article is part of The Quality Shareholder Initiative at the Center for Law, Economics
and Finance (C-LEAF), at The George Washington University Law School, Prof. Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Faculty Director.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing size and power of institutional investors is among the most important
contemporary trends in American corporate life.1 In recent years, their rise has drawn special
attention to shareholder activists on the one hand and passive index funds on the other. Lively
debates address whether such powerful investors have the right vision or conviction to faithfully
discharge the trust so many Americans have placed in them.
On vision, for two decades scholars have debated whether investors, especially activists,
are too short-term oriented for markets and managers to maintain a long-term view.2 On
conviction, just in the past two years scholars began to debate whether certain kinds of investors,
particularly passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively monitor managers to assure
performance over any horizon.3 In a related debate on shareholder voice in corporate affairs, some
scholars propose reducing the voting power of short-term shareholders to encourage long-term
thinking while others propose eliminating that of indexers due to their passivity.4
These are vital debates in corporate America, implicating fundamental questions of the
balance of power between directors and shareholders as well as among shareholders. As such, they
stoke numerous sub-debates on every aspect of corporate governance, such as board structures,
director-officer relationships, and shareholder rights.5 Participants see wide-ranging effects on the
national economy.6
Although such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve overlapping
participants, a peculiar binary characterizes the first two that afflicts the third. The horizon debate
juxtaposes short-term against long-term visions but mutes the issue of conviction, while the
conviction debate juxtaposes passive against active investment styles while muting the issue of

See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve
(September 20, 2018) (available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337) (the trend of rising power of
institutional investors increases the “likelihood that in the near future roughly twelve individuals will have
practical power over the majority of U.S. public companies”).
1

2

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735
(2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 655 (2010); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 Yale
L. J. 1554 (2015).
3
Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2019) (agency cost indictment of indexer
capability) with Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17 (2019) [hereinafter Fisch, The New
Titans] (ringing theoretical defense of indexer capability).
4

Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers
Lifetime Tenure?, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 991 (2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron Benjamin, Tenure
Voting and the US Public Company, 72 Bus. Law. 295 (2017).
5

See infra Part II.C.

6

E.g., Berger, et al., supra note 4, at 307-309.
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horizon. Hence in the voting debate, there are calls to limit voting power of both short-term
shareholders or indexers, but not both.7
In fact, however, while time horizon and relative conviction are vital, neither taken alone
captures the nuanced reality of investor behavior which, at a minimum, calls for examining both
features simultaneously. This Article proposes to incorporate such concurrent analysis of horizon
and conviction into all three of these corporate law debates. By switching from binary conceptions
to one that combines both attributes, analysis permits recognizing another cohort of shareholders
whose role has been missing in all three debates: long-term concentrated shareholders.
While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of institutional shareholders qualify
as short-term and another plurality as indexers, the long-term concentrated cohort remains a
significant force in market and corporate behavior.8 It should accordingly have an important place
in debates over horizon, conviction and voting.
This Article draws on related literature in finance and accounting, cited in these corporate
law debates, delineating multiple shareholder types based on both horizon and conviction.9 To
visualize the combined model, blended shareholder cohorts can be identified using a 2 x 2 diagram
arraying investment conviction across the top and investment horizon down the side to reveal
combinations of conviction and horizon.
INVESTMENT CONVICTION

Lower

Higher

Shorter

Transients

Activists

Longer

Indexers

Quality

INVESTMENT
HORIZON

To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients to shorterterm/diversifiers; indexers to longer-term diversifiers; activists to shorter-term concentrators; and
quality to longer-term concentrators. Investment conviction is measured by the degree of an
investor’s portfolio diversification versus concentration, with lower conviction meaning the most

7

See infra Part IV.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Quality Shareholders (forthcoming Columbia University Press
2020) [hereinafter Cunningham, Quality Shareholders], Appendix.
8

9

Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of
Institutional Investors, 16 J. App. Corp. Fin. 28, 29 (2004) [hereinafter Bushee, The “Right” Investors];
Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp.
L. 541, 549 n.6 (2016).
4

diversified portfolio—epitomized by index investors.10 Investment horizon is measured by the
investor’s average holding period in its investments.11
In corporate law scholarship, the horizon debate considers shorter versus longer investment
horizons (lower left panels of the graph) while the conviction debate considers lower versus higher
investment concentration (upper right panels in the graph). Combining the two would shift the
terms of debate from two pure binaries to an interactive quadrant (lower right panels of the graph).
Three immediate normative consequences follow.
First, adding conviction to the horizon debate would unlock stalemates on fundamental
issues addressing allocation of power between management and shareholders. In recent years, after
two decades of intense discussion, the empirical evidence concerning whether short-termism is
problematic remains inconclusive.12 One reason, however, is a tendency in this literature to
overlook significant differences among investors in their relative concentration, not merely time
horizons. It may be that short-term traders who also concentrate offset other perceived problems
of short-termism. Segmenting quality shareholders in research could help to inform sub-debates
on particular governance topics, such as board structures and director-manager relations.13
Second, including horizon in the indexing debate will illuminate equally fundamental
issues about the allocation of power among shareholders. The literature has tended to compare and
contrast passive indexers on the one hand with all other shareholder types as a whole, collectively
dubbed “active.”14 This tendency overlooks distinctions among the active cohort, lumping together
activists, transients and quality shareholders. Indexers may well engage too little, but so might
transients, perhaps warranting giving quality shareholders a special place in corporate decision
making. Likewise, transients may compare themselves to annualized index benchmarks, but
quality shareholders do not, focusing instead on long-term results.15
That leads to the third and most specific implication, concerning shareholder voting.
Combining shareholder conviction and shareholder time horizon opens new approaches to this
ultimate feature of the debates’ normative implications. To date, critics of short-termism prescribe
enhanced voting rights for long-term shareholders, in order to encourage longer time horizons
while critics of indexers prescribe excluding indexers from voting on the grounds of their passivity
and ignorance; opponents of both have pushed back accordingly.16
The critics in both such sub-debates may both be right to propose reducing the power of
transients and indexers, respectively. But the logic of combining the two critiques identifies a third
10

Martijn Cremes, Active Share and the Three Pillars of Active Management: Skill, Conviction,
and Opportunity, 73 Fin. Analysts J. 61 (2017).
11

See Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior,
73 Acc. Rev. 305, 330 (1998) [hereinafter Bushee, Myopic R&D].
12

See Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U.L. Rev. 971
(2019) (symposium issue on the horizon debate); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor,
41 Seattle L. Rev. 425 (2018) (symposium issue on the horizon debate).
13

See infra text accompanying notes 187-200.

14

See infra note 219.

15

See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.

16

See infra Part IV.
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way: voting rules that reward longevity and conviction. Call it quality voting. It is the clearest and
most important example of the many aspects of these three debates that would change by analyzing
investor horizon and conviction in combination.
The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in corporate governance.
With the rise of institutional investors has come increasing shareholder voice on a wide range of
matters, from director elections to say on executive pay and influence on corporate proposals
spanning from climate change and gender diversity to strategic direction and corporate priorities.
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive view of quality shareholders, pointing to how
their role should reshape these three debates. It proceeds as follows.
Part I presents the quadruple (2 x 2) typology of shareholder cohorts based upon time
horizon and relative concentration. These are the recognized categories in the broader literature,
and the two that dominate the respective debates on horizon and conviction. However, this
discussion focuses not on the activist or indexer—well covered in the literature and reconsidered
in ensuing Parts—but on the quality shareholder. While the quality shareholder is well-described
elsewhere in corporate law scholarship, and more broadly in financial scholarship and general
media, it has been virtually ignored in the corporate law debates on horizon, conviction and voting.
In the wider literature, the exemplar of quality shareholders are Warren Buffett and his
company, Berkshire Hathaway. With a pedigree dating back to John Maynard Keynes and a
following today commanding several trillions of dollars in invested assets, this cohort is vital. Its
distinguishing features are a long-term view and concentrated portfolios, in stark contrast to
transients and indexers. Part I introduces these investors, profiles their behavior, and demonstrates
their competitive position and enduring force in the marketplace.17
Part II reviews the horizon debate. In thumbnail fashion, given the age and extent of this
debate, it outlines the theoretical positions, empirical data, and normative legal implications. It
then expands upon the quadruple classification scheme and how adding this approach can
reinvigorate the horizon debate. While scholars cannot agree on whether short-termism is a
problem, critics who believe it is may be comforted by the force of quality shareholders and
defenders of the status quo may appreciate how such a contrast underscores additional limits of
short-term behavior. This Article illustrates the effects of adding quality shareholders using sub17

Among corporate law professors, I may be uniquely suited to elaborate on Buffett and this cohort,
having spent nearly three decades immersed in their ecosystem and publishing numerous articles and books
about them. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Cunningham’s Latest Book on Warren Buffett, Professor
Bainbridge Blog (July 21, 2014) (“Few people have done a better job of chronicling Warren Buffett’s
illustrious career than Law Professor Lawrence Cunningham. I’ve read all of [his] Buffett books and have
found each to be highly entertaining and informative.”). Work dates to the mid-1990s when I organized a
law review symposium featuring 25 corporate law professors dissecting my collection of Buffett’s writings.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Buffett Symposium, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 719
(1997); Warren E. Buffett & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for
Corporate America (5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays]. Recent articles include
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Disintermediation: A Managerial Model for the Next Generation,
50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 (2015); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes: The Visible Costs
of Buffett’s Managerial Model, 2016 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1. Recent books include Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia University Press 2014);
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Margin of Trust: The Berkshire Business Model (Columbia
University Press 2019).
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debates over staggered boards and splitting versus combining the roles of board chairman and
CEO.
Part III reviews the conviction debate. In somewhat more detail, given the nascent stage of
this debate, it reviews the positions, data, and upshot. As a critique of the current literature’s focus
on indexers versus all others (habitually called “active”), this delineates the active cohort further.
Among lessons that are uncovered, scholars focus on formulaic incentive models that assume all
“active” funds measure themselves against annual index benchmarks or growth in assets under
management,18 whereas quality shareholders put no stock in such references.19 The result is that
current research ignores the relevant incentives and must be expanded in order to increase its
relevance and reliability.
Part IV turns to shareholder voting implications. This is the most obvious topic requiring
updating to incorporate quality shareholders. After all, one upshot of the horizon debate is revived
interest in voting power based on holding periods (“tenured voting”); one upshot of the conviction
debate is new interest in reducing indexer voting power. Logic dictates considering voting rules
that do both, by increasing the voting power of quality shareholders.
Amid the fragmentation of the shareholder base and related debates, for instance, dual class
voting structures have proliferated to insulate companies from pressures of shareholder activists.20
Tenured voting has been advocated as a way to discourage short-term shareholdings21 while
exclusionary voting is being proposed to dilute the voice of indexers, seen to lack requisite
incentives or knowledge.22 All such proposals are reasonable responses to perceived imbalances.
But they are all incomplete, and point to the validity of a more complete shareholder voting
protocol, one based on both central behavioral tendencies of horizon and conviction.23
It is sometimes difficult to map theory onto practice, given the constraints of their different
realms.24 This reality may partially explain why the quality shareholder cohort has not received
the attention it should: it has been relatively easy to model and measure the incentives and profiles
of activist shareholders and index funds while the quality shareholder cohort contains more
numerous and idiosyncratic members. But by providing a behavioral profile along with data about
their performance and roles, this Article offers the promise of theorizing the practice.
I. QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS
This Part reviews the rise of the institutional investor industry, noting legal scholarship
reviewing it, and ensuing shareholder fragmentation. It reviews attempts to classify this
fragmented shareholder base, highlighting one that delineates according to normatively significant
dimensions of both horizon and conviction. The combination introduces a new shareholder cohort
18

See infra text accompanying notes 215-217.

19

See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.

20

See infra Part IV.A.

21

See infra Part IV.B.

22

See infra Part IV.C.

23

See infra Part IV.D.

See Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 925, 925 (1994); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 635, 639 (2003).
24
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to longstanding corporate law debates: the quality shareholder. Its behavioral attributes are
explained, along with the cohort’s competitive position, relative performance, and advantages this
approach offers to companies and fellow investors.
A. Fragmentation
In decades past, most shareholders were individuals. In 1965, for example, institutional
investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion
owned by individual households.25 Less than 15% of the market, or $100 billion, was held by the
day’s mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and
$21 billion 5%, 6%, and 3%).26
With shareholders so dispersed, prominent corporate theorists had for decades described
the challenge of corporate life as the “separation of ownership from control.”27 It would be difficult
for shareholders to act collectively and often irrational for them to incur the costs necessary to
monitor corporate management.28 In this structure, managers held the balance of power over
corporate destiny—in American corporate finance, there were strong managers yet weak owners.29
Corporate law’s principal task, then, was to mitigate the attendant agency costs.30
Post-1965, however, trends moved from individual to institutional ownership and, by the
1990s, those trends had become so powerful that corporate law scholars came to believe that they
might mitigate these historical problems.31 A promising agenda emerged to enable institutional
investors to monitor management more effectively.32 Guidance was provided on what to expect,
including realistic cautionary notes, but in general the rise of institutional investors held out great
promise for corporate governance.33
These hopes, however, have been disappointed, as the rise of institutional investors altered
but did not resolve the longstanding challenges. Today, institutions command the vast majority of

25

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States:
Historical Annual Tables (1965-1974).
26
27

Id.
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr.& Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property

(1933).
28

See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate
Finance (1994).
29

30

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
31

Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990).
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991).
32

33

See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991).
8

the $30+ trillion in total market capitalization.34 Among these are mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies together commanding a decisive majority (respectively, $9.1 trillion,
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion). They present the old problems of agency costs in new ways due to
three critical changes in the institutional investor landscape that have occurred in the past two
decades.
Foremost, a large and growing percentage of shares are held by indexers. Indexing involves
buying proportional stakes in every stock listed in some benchmark index, such as the S&P 500 or
Russell 3000, without doing any research or being exposed to anything but the market risk-return.
Popularized by the late Jack Bogle, indexing was a marginal practice through the 1990s, but today
is a familiar approach. Bogle’s company, Vanguard, is a household name. Large indexers
command trillions of assets, representing one-quarter to one-third or more of total U.S. public
company equity. In 1997, less than 8% of mutual funds were indexed, whereas today more than
40% are.
Second is the substantial shortening of average holding periods, indicative of increased
trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies, and other short-term drivers. The best-selling financial
author, Michael Lewis, dramatized the stakes in his 2014 book, Flash Boys, and the pace of
acceleration continues with sustained technological advances in computing algorithms, artificial
intelligence and machine learning.35 Average holding periods shortened significantly from the
mid-1960s through the early- or mid- 2000s;36 while the average has held steady since, this appears
to be due to how the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent holdings of the
indexers.37
Third is the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies have roamed corporate America since
the Gilbert brothers popularized the practice in the 1950s.38 And from the 1970s through the 1990s,
incumbent managers faced constant threats to corporate control from rival firms, takeover artists,
and colorful raiders such as Carl Icahn and Nelson Peltz.39 But it is only in the past two decades
that a vast pool of capital developed among specialty firms, dubbed shareholder activists, dedicated
to the practice and featuring a well-developed playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and
repeat players such as Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb and Paul Singer.40
34

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States:
Historical Annual Tables (2005-2015); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial
Accounts of the United States, Second Quarter 2018 at 130.
35

See Tom C. W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 531

(2019).
36

Anne M. Tucker, The Long and The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment
Time Horizons, 43 Iowa J. Corp. L. 581 (2018) (through 2000); Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at 992
(through 2007).
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and
Firm Value, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 387, at n. 42 (2018) [hereinafter Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors].
38
See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings: From Populist
to Virtual, Financial History (Fall 2018)
37

39

See Knights, Raiders and Targets (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).
See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to Institutional Investor Activism:
Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation 1-38 (2015).
40
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Facing these forces, it has been easy to overlook the enduring power of the traditional
cohort of individual and institutional investors who prefer old-fashioned techniques famously
known as buy-and-hold. The style is epitomized by Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway and
boasts such notable historical figures as John Maynard Keynes and Benjamin Graham, along with
such legacy names as John Neff of Wellington Management or Thomas Rowe Price and his
eponymous firm, T. Rowe Price Group Inc.41
B. Classification
Today’s diverse shareholder base can be classified in a variety of ways. Examples include
formal, functional or behavioral. Which approach is appropriate depends on the purpose of the
classification, such as the viewpoint of potential customers, regulators, or researchers.
An obvious formal starting point distinguishes individuals from institutions, which is both
straightforward and useful. This delineation is useful for fundamental issues such as the role of
government. For example, a government agency might plausibly be charged with developing
educational programs for individuals but not institutions and likewise be asked to provide oversight
for institutional investors but not individuals.42
A classic formal delineation of institutional investors considers legal form of organization.
Examples: banks, hedge funds, index funds, investment advisors, insurance companies, and mutual
funds.43 Such a scheme is useful for many purposes, such as determining beneficiaries and
fiduciary duties, regulatory restrictions and competitive pressures.44
In more functional terms, investment strategy is a way to sort institutional investors, such
as technical versus fundamental, growth versus value, or quantitative versus qualitative.45 Those
alternatives would be of special interest when investigating relative investment appeal, such as
risk-adjusted returns or volatility.46
Another functional approach would examine trading behavior. For instance, how different
shareholders use information may be important when studying market efficiency47 or formulating

41

See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8.

Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities
Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (2009).
42

43

See Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at 992. Institutions cater to different clienteles, such as
consumers, retirees, labor union members or high net worth individuals.
44
Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9.
45

Institutional investors follow a variety of different investment strategies (such as value, growth
or income) or different target size (such as small or large cap). Some funds combine these features,
classifying as large value, large growth, small value, or small growth. They may rivet on particular sectors
or geographic regions or attempt to buy small stakes in essentially every company in the stock market.
46

Some have objectives in addition to traditional shareholder returns, such as promoting the
interests of labor See David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best
Weapon (2018); Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders:
Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 187 (2012); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
47

See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980).
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securities regulations.48 Helpful categories include: insiders, market makers, noise traders,
liquidity traders, and information traders.49 These groups differ in terms of their access to and use
of information, with significant effects on market performance and optimal disclosure laws.50
A behavior-based classification of investors might incorporate such varying approaches to
handling information. The behavioral division might also consider the central questions in the
corporate law debates over time horizons and conviction levels.
In the early 1990s, for example, Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter
compared institutional investor behavior in the U.S. with counterparts in Germany and Japan,
whose economies were operating more productively.51 He reported a U.S. propensity toward either
indexing or trading compared to the more concentrated and patient investor model prevalent
abroad.
In the late 1990s, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business School Professor Brian
Bushee extended Porter’s analysis.52 Bushee noted that Porter’s critique overlooked the significant
group of U.S. investors who both concentrate and hold—a blind spot that persists in the corporate
law literature.53 But he stressed that Porter’s insight warranted focusing on differences among
shareholders represented by two variables: time horizon and conviction.54 Bushee identified three
categories of institutional investors as follows:
“transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small
stakes in portfolio companies;
“dedicated” institutions, which provide stable ownership and take large
positions in individual firms; and
“quasi-indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to
an index strategy).55
Bushee’s empirical work was straightforward. He computed various measures of horizon
and conviction: horizon by quarterly portfolio turnover as well as portion held more than two years
and conviction by average percentage ownership of investees, the percentage of investees

48

See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
Duke L.J. 711, 722 (2006).
49

See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in
Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015, 1023-24.
50

Insiders have company information but securities laws limit their right to use it; market makers
may have the information but their trades support balancing supply and demand; noise traders chase fads;
liquidity traders act for nonfundamental reasons, such as funding needs or calibrating to an index; and
information traders do the heavy lifting of digesting and acting on information. See id.
51

Michael Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. App. Corp.
Fin. (1992).
52
53

Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29.
See infra Parts II & III.

54

Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29-30 (using the words stability and stakes rather
than horizon or conviction but synonymously).
55

Id. Shareholder activists are introduced into this schematic below, infra text accompanying note

70.
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representing at least a 5% share of the portfolio, and the average size of each investment.56 He
then combined the horizon and conviction computations to capture the two factors together.
With that ranking, Bushee clustered the results into the three shareholder types and
identified exemplars of each. Transients, with short time horizons and small stakes, are typified
by Numeric, he said, a fund that specializes in exploiting dynamic stock market activity, not
fundamental investment analysis of business; quasi-indexers, which buy small stakes in 500 to
3000 stocks representing an entire market basket, is exemplified by CalPERS, Bushee wrote, the
large California pension fund; and dedicated shareholders, those who buy large stakes and hold
them for long periods, are epitomized by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, he said.57
Professor Bushee’s work has been widely influential. For example, decades after
publication, consulting firm McKinsey & Company offered a similar take.58 It calls equivalent
categories by different names: intrinsic instead of dedicated; mechanical instead of quasi-indexers;
and traders instead of transients. But the analytical utility of the McKinsey and Bushee lexicons
are the same and offer a valuable lens for purposes ranging from evaluating investor performance
to expected handling of information and likelihood of different shareholder cohorts being informed
participants in shareholder voting.
In finance scholarship, numerous empirical studies develop tests to identify shareholders
who rank high by combined horizon duration and portfolio concentration. For instance, University
of Connecticut finance professor Paul Borochin, and researcher Jie Yang, developed such a
database to determine the effects of shareholder base on a company’s governance structure and
economic value.59 Finance professors Martjin Cremers of Notre Dame University and Ankur
Pareek of University of Nevada created a large data set of all institutional investors dating to 1980,
presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s concentration and average holding period.60 The
scholars have been using this data to conduct a variety of tests concerning relative investor
performance.61
In legal scholarship, Professor Belinfanti, in her research on how companies can shape
their shareholder base, canvassed multiple alternative methods of classifying investors.62
Belinfanti features Professor Bushee’s method prominently, describing it as a “contemporary”
56

Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29-30.

57

Id.
Robert N. Palter et al., Communicating with The “Right” Investors, in McKinsey on Finance:
The Enduring Value of Fundamentals, 40 McKinsey & Co. 57, 58-59 (2011).
58

59

Paul Borochin & Jie Yang The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation
and Governance, 126 J. Fin. Econ. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score model for identify
quality shareholders, dubbed DED for dedicated, after Bushee, in the model).
60

Martjin Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of High
Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 288 (2016). (concept of “active share”
measures relative concentration of a portfolio compared to a benchmark index, with a pure index active
share equal to zero and a completely concentrated portfolio equal to one).
61

The data and related research are posted on the Notre Dame University web site.
https://activeshare.nd.edu/academic-research/.
62

Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 789,
818 (2014).
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method to “drill down” beyond conventional classifications to focus on important behaviors and
propensities.63
Professors Dallas and Barry use Bushee’s classification system in their empirical work on
shareholder voting regimes.64 They too note alternative approaches to classifying investors, such
as formal categories like type of business organization.65 But for purposes of corporate law, they
stressed that what matters most is behavior, particularly time horizons and conviction levels.66
Dallas and Barry summarize the implications of Bushee’s classification scheme for this purpose
as follows:67
Transient shareholders . . . have the least incentive to “understand drivers
of long-run value.”
Dedicated investors . . . have the greatest incentive to think about the long
term and to take an active role in corporate governance and monitoring of portfolio
companies. . . .
Quasi-indexers fall between the other two categories. They . . . have good
incentives to think about the company's long-term value, but do not have good
incentives to be involved in corporate governance and oversight.
Since Bushee developed his classification system in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
activist shareholder segment developed into a distinctive cohort.68 Within Bushee’s system, they
might be classified as transients if they held for short periods and in low concentrations. But most
are highly concentrated in their positions, and sometimes even hold for above-average periods,
though their time horizon is routinely portrayed in the literature as short-term.69
Given that shareholder activists adopt a unique approach to engagement,70 by public
campaigns for corporate change, separately classifying this cohort is analytically useful. The
scholarship in the corporate horizon debate provides behavioral profiles of activists, transients and
indexers, to be reviewed in Parts II and III. It has not developed a behavioral profile of the quality
shareholder, though this cohort features in other strands of corporate law scholarship. Accordingly,
this Part will continue by presenting such a profile.
63

Id.

64

Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 549 n.6 (2016). Part IV of this Article addresses the literature on
shareholder voting regimes and normative implications of this Article’s analysis.
65

Id. at n.270.

66

Behavior changes over time. For example, Bushee estimates that about 1/5 of institutional
investors change their Bushee classification over a three-year period. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at
n. 116 (citing correspondence between Bushee and Dallas).
67

Dallas &. Barry, supra note 9, at 625-627 (citations omitted).

68

See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40.

69

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1083 (2007) (“Hedge funds come close to being the archetypal shortterm investor”); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 Iowa J. Corp. L. 545, 573-574 (2016) (observing that hedge funds
might be “archetypical” short-term shareholder but noting that many mutual funds are too).
70

See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40.
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C. Behavior
Professor Bushee named Buffett as exemplifying the “dedicated” or quality shareholder.71
Other empirical research identifying quality shareholders invariably place Buffett and Berkshire
Hathaway at or near the top.72 Many other corporate law scholars have echoed the point, including
Professor Dallas in her use of the Bushee model in her empirical work.73 Professors Choi and
Pritchard, in their discussion of the various behaviors that diverse shareholders exhibit, suggested
that Buffett is the “paradigm” of such an approach.74 Buffett’s standing as a model of the patient
committed shareholder has been particularly common among scholars of trust law, where
investment theory plays a central role.75
Based on my extensive research and writings with and about Buffett over the past three
decades, I concur in the conclusion and can explain the behavior.76 First, while Bushee’s reference
was to Buffett as a shareholder, it is equally true that Buffett, as CEO of Berkshire Hathaway,
consciously cultivated such a cohort among its shareholders.77 He began doing so two decades
before Bushee minted his classification, when Buffett referred to Bushee’s cohort of “dedicated”
shareholders as “quality” shareholders.78 Since this is also an adjective often used by corporate
scholars to designate a variety of shareholder behaviors, it is the term this Article will use.79

71

Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 30-31.
E.g., Borochin & Yang, supra note 59; Cremers & Pareek, supra note 60; Cunningham, Quality
Shareholders, supra note 8, Appendix.
72

73

Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 625-627.
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 n.

74

65 (2003).
75

E.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, The Uniform Trust Code and the
Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1165, 1190-1195 (2008) (sharply contrasting Buffett with
indexers as well as transients, drawing on prominent detailed accounts of Buffett’s philosophy, including
my work); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent
Investor Doctrine?, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 851, 873-874 (2010) (noting my views on Buffett).
76
77

See supra note 17.
See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 185-188.

78

See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 849,
879 (2012) (quoting Buffett’s description of Berkshire’s goal and strategy to attract “high quality
shareholders”); Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 185-188 (“attracting quality
shareholders”).
79

E.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 493,519 (2005) (quoting a U.K.
government official as favoring “high quality shareholder engagements”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch,
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability? 83 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1119, 1164 n. 114 (2016) (referring to shareholder proposals as being of “higher- or lower- quality”);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Activism, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 913 (2013)
(referring to the relative quality of shareholder activist proposals).
The term should be compared with that of quality investing, referring to an investment strategy
seeking to find high-quality businesses that may be purchased at a reasonable price. See infra note 88.
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While Buffett is certainly an exemplar, he is part of a long tradition extending back many
decades, and will leave a legacy of legions of followers in his wake. As for predecessors, consider
John Maynard Keynes, the distinguished economist, scholar and investor. Keynes stated his
philosophy, based on years of experience and reflection: “I get more and more convinced that the
right method in investments is to put fairly large sums” in select enterprises and that it is “a mistake
to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between [diverse] enterprises.”80 Rather,
Keynes avowed: “I believe now that successful investment depends on . . . a steadfast holding . . .
in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for several years. . . .”81
Professor Amy Westbrook noted Keynes’ influence on Buffett in her portrait of their style,
stressing patience and conviction as defining features.82 On concentration, she notes that
diversification is “close to godliness” on Wall Street, but that Buffett holds the opposite
conviction.83 On the long-term view, Westbrook explains how Buffett consciously cultivated
fellow shareholders with such a view because it was so important to his own approach. She
explained: “In a world in which investors are told that seconds matter and trading is easy, he
advocates buying Berkshire stock and then not touching it again.”84
Another Buffett predecessor was Benjamin Graham, his professor at Columbia University
and a renowned investor and educator.85 Graham taught Buffett—and two generations of
followers—the art of value investing.86 This involves conducting fundamental analysis of
businesses to estimate their value and then buying only the small number that can be obtained at a
price substantially below estimated value.87 A modern variation on Graham’s technique is called
quality investing, or growth investing, which expands the pool to include buying stocks at a price
that is low in relation to reasonably anticipated growth in intrinsic value.88

80

John F. Wasik, Keynes’s Way to Wealth: Timeless Investment Principles from the Great
Economist (McGraw Hill 2014).
81

David Chambers, Elroy Dimson & Justin Foo, Keynes the Stock Market Investor: A Quantitative
Analysis, 50 J. Fin. Quant. Analy. 843 (2015). Keynes managed investments for Cambridge University’s
King’s College from 1927 to 1945. He concentrated as much as half the portfolio in five companies, and
held them at least five years apiece. See Allen C. Benello, Michael Van Biema & Tobias E. Carlisle,
Concentrated Investing (2017), at 48, 51. Despite working in a challenging era that included the Great
Depression and World War II, returns were impressive: a compound annual growth rate of 9.12% in contrast
to the broad U.K. market return of negative 0.89%. Id. at 58.
82

Amy Deen Westbrook, Warren Buffett’s Corporation: Reconnecting Owners and Managers, 34
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 515, 544-545 (2009).
83

Id.

84

Id. at 535.

85

See Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (1959); Benjamin Graham & David Dodd,
Security Analysis (1962).
86

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren
Buffett (2001); Warren Buffett, The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, Hermes (1985).
87

Bruce N. Greenwald, et al., Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond (2001).

88

See Cornelius C. Bond, T. Rowe Price: The Man, The Company, and The Investment Philosophy
(2019); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Torkell T. Eide & Patrick Hargreaves, Quality Investing (2016);
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Professor Lowenstein distilled the Buffett/Graham approach in his corporate law
scholarship.89 Lowenstein stressed that this approach to investing is based on fundamental business
analysis—neither indexing nor trading. The principal criteria are: conviction, by holding fewer
than 20 stocks, and patience, by holding stocks for an average of at least two years.90
Quality shareholders adopt a wide variety of diverse strategies for buying, holding or
selling, and engaging with management. Buying may be made in accordance with the tenets of
Graham’s pure value investing, the growth investing extension, or some other variant.91 In all
cases, however, the investment decision is based upon fundamental business analysis—neither
trading activity nor indexing.92 Concentration is invariably the result.93
Likewise, quality shareholders may adopt different policies concerning whether and when
to sell shares. Although most usually follow Buffett to prefer permanent holding periods,94 some
may sell when price rises to a significant multiple of value.95
Finally, quality shareholders have varying propensities concerning engagement, though
their tendency is monitoring at a distance and consulting when asked.96 Buffett is again seen to
exemplify this stance. Professors Bratton and McCarey put it this way:
The model block owner is the legendary Warren Buffett, a fundamental value
investor who takes large, under-diversified, long-term positions; monitors
carefully; but does not attempt to interfere with the formulation or implementation
of the business plan, except in a crisis.97
Manifestations of Buffett’s approach include Berkshire’s large long-term stakes in a
relatively small number of companies. Exquisite examples of stakes still held today are 17.9% of
American Express, initially acquired in 1962; 9.4% of Coca-Cola, initially acquired in 1984; and
9.8% of Wells Fargo, initially acquired in 1989.98 All of these companies have faced business
Clifford S. Asness, Quality Minus Junk, 24 Rev. Acc. Stud. 34 (2019); Robert Novy-Marx, Quality
Investing (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9480/0c35aff62f304d42ac8a9112cd9f40d8e59f.pdf.
89

Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors In a Perfect Storm, 30 J. Corp. L. 539, 547
(2005). Professor Lowenstein was a close personal friend of Warren Buffett and long-time investor in
Berkshire Hathaway. His son, Roger, a prominent journalist and author, wrote the classic biography,
Warren Buffett: The Making of An American Capitalist.
90
91

Lowenstein, Searching, supra note 89, at 547.
See John Train, Money Masters of Our Time (2000), p. 306.

92

Robert G. Hagstrom, The Warren Buffett Portfolio: Mastering the Power of the Focus Investment
Strategy 31 (1999).
93

See Allen C. Benello, Michael Van Biema & Tobias E. Carlisle, Concentrated Investing (2017).

94

See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17.

95

E.g., John Neff, On Investing (1999) 116-117 (Neff, a quality shareholder, explaining that “you
don’t have to buy and hold forever”).
96

See Robert P. Miles, Warren Buffett Wealth: Principles and Practical Methods Used by the
World’s Greatest Investor 33-34 (2004).
97

William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and
Corporate Self-regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1861, 1919, n. 224 (1995).
98

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report (2019).
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challenges during Berkshire’s ownership and Buffett has helped behind the scenes, but never
interfered publicly.99
Concerning conviction, quality shareholders view themselves as part owners of a business.
Such an ownership sense requires conviction, reflected in thorough research and disciplined
decisions. As put by the venerable firm of Ruane Cunniff, founded by another Graham student and
Buffett classmate, William Ruane: “We take pride and pleasure in investigating a company from
all angles, doing the kind of on-the-ground, primary research that an enterprising journalist might
do.”100 Quality shareholders concentrate, often limiting their portfolios to some 20 companies.101
Concerning time horizon, quality shareholders are fond of following Buffett in saying their
favorite holding period is forever.102 They are not motivated to beat the market in any given year
but to generate returns over long periods of time. Since quality shareholders are generally risk
averse, sustained patience reduces both reinvestment risk and expense risk.103 Owning outstanding
companies for very long periods not only limits risk but reaps the benefits of compounding, a
cherished principle of quality shareholders.104
Quality shareholders reject the prevailing fashion of comparing their annual return with
some benchmark index.105 They eschew reference to the relative volatility of the indexes.106
99

See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Margin of Trust 78 (2019). In 2014 a
shareholder activist launched a public campaign challenging Coca-Cola’s executive compensation plan and
urged Berkshire to support it. Instead, Buffett privately engaged outside of the spotlight to resolve the issue.
In 2016 concerning American Express, Buffett declined an overture from a shareholder activist seeking
change, favoring direct consultation with long-time chief executive officer.
100

Ruane Cuniff website.

101

E.g., Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb: “Our small collection of investments bears little resemblance
to the S&P 500 or any other index. In fact, our top ten investments often account for >60% of the value of
our portfolios. The S&P 500 may be relevant for assessing our performance over the long term, but it has
no bearing on how we construct our portfolios.”
Southeastern Asset Management: “We are long-term owners, not traders or speculators, and invest
for the long-term based on objective intrinsic values with a horizon of at least five years. We construct our
portfolios with what we believe to be our best 18-22 global investment ideas. Concentrating allows for
adequate diversification while providing some of the best opportunities to maximize returns, and minimize
loss of principal.”
102

See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17.
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On reinvestment risk, selling shares results in capital needing to be reinvested and finding new
outstanding investments is time-consuming and difficult. On expense risk, trading and taxes are immediate
costs of selling, disguising the stated nominal returns that draw attention.
104

See Warren Buffett, The Joys of Compounding (1963).

105

E.g., FundSmith: “Over a sufficient period of time, you will no doubt want to assess our
performance against a range of benchmarks – the performance of cash, bonds, equities and other funds, and
we will assist you in that process by providing comparisons. However, we do not think it is helpful to make
comparisons with movements in other asset prices or indices over the short term, as we are not trying to
provide short term performance.”
106

E.g., Cedar Rock Capital Partners: “We make no effort to minimize volatility relative to any
national, regional or global index of equity market performance. However, we expect our emphasis on both
quality and value to generate satisfactory absolute and relative performance over the long term.”
17

Quality shareholders object to the common habit of distinguishing between passive index funds
on one hand and all others, dubbed “active,” on the other.107 They invest for, and measure
performance, over many years, not annually as is the obsession of many commentators.108
The philosophy of quality shareholders can be further illuminated by contrasting it with
that of indexers. Indexers believe in efficient markets: that share prices reflect future prospects.
Quality shareholders doubt that numbers capture all, whether computed by humans, powerful
computers, or elaborate algorithms. Quality shareholders conduct the fundamental analysis that is
necessary in order to promote stock market efficiency. In their view, passive funds free ride off of
that work.109
The Keynes-Graham-Buffett model continues to attract a large following of quality
shareholders. Many are powerful names recognized in the institutional investor world. To
illustrate, the following lists top quality shareholders as identified by Professors Borochin and
Yang:110
Top Quality
Berkshire Hathaway
Capital Research & Management
Fidelity Management & Research
107

E.g., Baillee Gifford:

We are not passive investors who think that current share prices capture the future prospects
of companies. We don’t believe that investment decisions can be made on numbers alone, even
by supercomputers and complex algorithms. Passive has its place, providing low-cost market
access with, on average, better after-fees results than active managers. However, it has little to do
with the process of allocating capital to innovative companies—though on that point it has much
in common with many active managers.
We are not a typical active manager either: we believe this term has become a one-size-fitsall description which is very unhelpful for investors. It has been hijacked by many fund managers
who think it suggests ‘activity’ and simply being different from an index. The reality is that much
of this activity has more to do with trying to outsmart other investors than with the creative
deployment of capital, and that defining active as being different from an index is to start in the
wrong place. This is why most active investors fail to deliver returns that outperform passive
investment strategies over the long term. They’re not even trying to do the fundamental job of
investing.
108

Gardner Russo Gardner:

[Portfolio concentration] may mean temporary depression of market values for companies if
and when they are out of favor. However, reduced share prices as a result of market sentiment do
not necessarily relate to reduced prospects for our companies’ operations. Accordingly, we prefer
not to move from sector to sector, following the bubble of the moment. Rather, we prefer to
patiently await the market’s return to recognition of our businesses’ intrinsic value. [T]his may
mean that our portfolios undergo periodic under-performance versus the market as a whole. . . .
Because our core positions can be heavily weighted, performance of our portfolios can be
dampened by market sentiment, which we regard, however, as immaterial to our investments’
long-term potential.
109

See Howard Marks, Investing Without People (2018).

110

Borochin & Yang, supra note 59.
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Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds)
State Farm Insurance
Southeastern Asset Management
Wellington Management

Like Berkshire, these quality shareholders have large parts of their portfolios invested in
sizable stakes of major companies held for many years. Examples: Capital Research in Abbott
Labs; Fidelity in SalesForce; Harris in Tenet Health; State Farm in Air Products; Southeastern in
Graham Holdings; and Wellington in Marsh & McLennan and PNC Financial.111 Other examples
of such quality shareholders and stakes are the positions of Franklin Resources in Roper and
Massachusetts Financial in Accenture.112
Despite convictions, quality shareholders face relentless competitive pressures.
D. Competition and Performance
Today’s institutional investors face pressure to favor indexing or transience. Compensation
of fund managers is often based on annual returns, so the question becomes whether an investor
beat the market for a given year or not. In such an environment, pressure is substantial to diversify
widely on the one hand and, on the other, to chase returns by rapid trading. While quality
shareholders reject and resist such approaches, the result is a rising portion of indexers and
transients compared to quality shareholders.
The effects of this intensive environment are reflected in estimates of the relative size of
these cohorts. The number of different indexes has proliferated—at least 60 major ones by one
count, with Morningstar alone designating at least 300 different indexes.113 Self-described index
funds easily manage at least 20% of total market capitalization, a figure that rises to as much as
40% if counting funds that hug indexes without describing themselves as index funds.114
111

See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8.
Id.
113
Families of benchmarks propagate multiple indexes, now numbering as many as 60. These
include Dow Jones (at least 6: DJ Industrial Average, DJ US Select Dividend, DJ Wilshire 4500 and DJ
Wilshire 5000); FTSE (4: FTSE High Dividend Yield, FTSE RAFI US 100 and Mid Small 1500);
NASDAQ (2: NASDAQ 100 and the NASDAQ Composite); and Schwab (2, including the Schwab 1000
and Schwab Small Cap. Dozens more are offered by several behemoths delineating among small, mid and
large cap plus their value and growth components: MSCI (15 different ones), S&P (14) and Russell (13).
112

114

Recently, total market cap of the Russell 3000 was about $30 trillion. Of that, operators of the
largest passive indexers commanded nearly half at around $14 trillion (though some run stock-picking funds
too). Pension funds as a group held about 1/3 or $9 trillion, much prone to quasi-indexing, though some to
dedication. Activist hedge funds own a sliver—around $100 billion or 1%—though they back that capital
with powerful game-changing strategies for companies. Given the high level of aggregate share turnover—
average holding periods barely near one year—many on the typical shareholder list don’t stay a long time,
making for a sizable portion of transients.
More specifically, five of the largest activist hedge funds command in aggregate perhaps $100
billion (Ichan, Third Point, ValueAct, Pershing, Trian) whereas the largest four financial institutions
manage $14 trillion (BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard and Fidelity). Among pension funds, the five
largest together run nearly $1 trillion (CalPERs, CALSTRs, STRS Ohio). The quality investing cohort
represents the rest. Yet the power of even such relatively small stakes is immense. For perspective, the
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Transient holders are numerous, reflected in high share turnover. In the past two decades,
average holding periods for hedge funds have fallen to under one year and for mutual funds under
two.115 In recent years, overall average time horizons have remained unchanged, though this is
likely due to the rise of indexers, which trade infrequently, offset by the rise in transients, which
trade often.116 Together, this transient cohort represents perhaps as much as 40% of total market
capitalization as well.117
At the other extreme, activists in aggregate command relatively small stakes, not likely
more than 5% of all, though they strategically leverage their power during campaigns. Quality
shareholders make up the rest.118 While small overall—perhaps 15% of all equity—this cohort can
be mobilized for amplified influence, sometimes playing important roles in corporate power
struggles.119
What leads a particular investor, or institution, to adopt one investment strategy or another
is partly a function of personality and partly of expected returns.120 For nearly two decades, debate
has raged around whether stock indexing or stock picking is a superior strategy, often delineating
further into types of broad indexes (by size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing
against that benchmark.121 Debate dates to a 1997 article by Mark Carhart, then a professor of
finance at the University of Southern California, finding no evidence of successful mutual fund
stock pickers.122
Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom, such as: average
active funds underperform the market after fees;123 top fund performance doesn’t persist;124 and,
while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for customers after fees.125 Yet debate
largest listed companies now boast market caps around $1 trillion and many smaller ones around $4 to $10
billion.
115
116

117
118

See supra note 36 (citing sources).
See supra text accompanying note 37.
See supra note 114.
See supra note 114.

See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 (chapter 2) (giving examples of quality
shareholders’ roles in activist campaigns concerning Pernod Ricard, Ashland Global Holdings, and United
Technologies).
119
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See Henrik Cronqvista, Stephan Siegelb, & Frank Yua, Value Versus Growth Investing: Why
Do Different Investors Have Different Styles?, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 333 (2015).
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See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional
Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively
Managed Mutual Funds, 75 Fin. Analysts J. 8 (2019).
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Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. Fin. 57 (1997) (finding that
the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio
managers”). Michael Jensen conducted an earlier kindred study. Michael Jensen, The Performance of
Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. Fin. 389 (1968).
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William Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 Fin. Analysts J. 7 (1991).
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Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. Fin. 57 (1997).
Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund
Performance, 65 J. Fin. 915 (2010).
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continues—and Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over hedge funds—at least those
charging particularly high fees.126 Multiple editions of best-selling books continue to showcase
dueling university professors: University of Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has
repeatedly shown that buy-and-hold works,127 while Princeton University finance professor Burton
Malkiel continues to release new editions of the book that legitimized indexing as a strategy.128
Changes in shareholder demographics during the past two decades, including increased
competition and lower fees, has produced a new strand of research challenging these conventional
views. For instance, there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent
index;129 some top-performance records do persist;130 and a sizable cohort of managers with
particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.131 Among those traits are conviction and
patience, the defining traits of quality shareholders.
E. Advantages
Each shareholder segment adds unique value: activists promote management
accountability; index funds enable millions to enjoy market returns at low cost; and traders offer
liquidity.
With such advantages, however, come disadvantages: activists becoming overzealous;
indexers lacking resources to understand specific company details; and traders inducing a shortterm focus. Quality shareholders balance the base, and counteract these downsides.
As to curbing overzealous activism, quality shareholders can be white squires—a term
dating to the 1980s referring to block shareholders tending to support management.132 When a
board perceives activist excess, it helps to have a few large long-term owners to consult. As a
In 2008, Buffett bet a hedge fund manager the S&P 500 would, over the ensuing ten years,
outperform, after fees, any hedge fund portfolio the manager cared to assemble. See Buffett & Cunningham,
The Essays, supra note 17, at 180-183. The manager assembled a fund of funds, a configuration charging
multiple layers of high fees. During the first three years, the S&P lagged the fund, but by bet’s end, the
S&P won. If many took from the bet the lesson that indexers are always superior to non-indexed investing,
that is a mistake. The primary point was to stress that ordinary individuals are almost certainly better off,
given the risks and fees, of staking their savings in index funds rather than entrusting it to high-cost hedge
funds.
126
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See Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (5th ed. 2014); see also Louis Engel & Henry R.
Hecht, How to Buy Stocks (8th ed. 1994).
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See Burton G. Malkeil, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (12th ed. 2019).
Jonathan Berk & Jules van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 118 J. Fin.
l Econ. (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 Ann. Rev.
Fin. Econ. 147 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill,
Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 N. Am. J. Econ. Fin. 222 (2017).
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Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 569 (2005); Robert Kowoski, Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual
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united front, the company’s hand is strengthened, resisting excess while addressing legitimate
concerns activist may have.133
Quality shareholders study company specifics which indexers, being stretched thin,
cannot.134 Indexers may be good at analyzing dynamic issues as they arise, but rarely develop deep
knowledge that quality shareholders command. Indexers invest most of their limited resources to
develop views about what is best generally in corporate governance, not what is best for particular
companies.
Quality shareholders differ from both activists and indexers regarding director elections.
While activists often nominate directors fellow board members resist, and indexers almost never
nominate directors at all, quality shareholders offer a supply of outstanding directors for their
investees, often themselves.135
Being long-term, quality shareholders offset the short-term preferences of transients. A
high density of quality shareholders, with their characteristic patience, helps managers operate
strategically, with a long-term outlook.136 Such effects can percolate throughout a company. If less
pressure comes from shareholders to produce short-term results, then directors, officers,
employees, suppliers, strategic partners and others can operate in the same manner.137
Shareholder cohorts have different preferences about the price levels of stocks they own.
Transients generally prefer the highest price possible for maximum profit on immediate sale;
indexers favor the highest reasonable price because they assume, consistent with efficient market
theory, that price and value are substantially the same; and quality shareholders, generally
uninterested in an immediate sale and attune to stock market volatility, prefer a stock price that
bears the most rational relationship possible to the company’s intrinsic business value.138 (At
purchase, of course, quality shareholders seek prices below value.)139
Many managers tend to likewise prefer the highest possible stock price, perceiving it as a
measure of their own performance, the higher the better.140 But while they often complain that
their company’s stock price is too low, under- and over-pricing are equally likely and neither is
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desirable.141
A share price that is rationally related to business value can be a huge asset for several
purposes, including making acquisitions, compensating employees, and facilitating fairly priced
gains (or losses) when shareholders must sell.142 While there is a lively debate over the degree of
such market efficiency—of how well price approximates value—companies with the closest
nexus enjoy clear advantages over those with the widest gaps. Evidence suggests that companies
with ownership dominated by quality shareholders tend to enjoy stock prices that are less volatile
and more rationally related to business value.143
With such advantages on offer, amid today’s fragmented shareholder base, the quality
shareholder cohort remains a valuable force in the investment community and stock markets.
II. TIME HORIZON
For decades, corporate law professors have debated shareholder time horizons. Critics
focus on the short-termism of the shareholder activist. Defenders dispute the claim that shorttermism is a problem at all, let alone one exemplified by activists.
Amid the academic debate, considerable policy changes occurred in the broader process of
legal and business evolution. These policy dynamics were so diverse—expanding shareholder
power in some areas while curtailing it in others—that both sides of the academic debate could
cite accomplishments but would also have to acknowledge setbacks.144
At present, therefore, the academic debate is at something of a stalemate. This Part reviews
the academic theory and debate, along with the major policy implications, illustrating important
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effects of adding quality shareholders on topics such as staggered boards and splitting versus
combining the roles of board chairman and CEO.
A. Theory and Debate
In traditional economic theory concerning stock market prices and managerial behavior,
short-termism cannot exist.145 For one, competitive processes optimize any trade-off between
short- and long-term values.146 In addition, efficient stock markets rapidly impound into price all
relevant long-run information.147 At a minimum, current stock price is the best estimate of longterm corporate value.148 Strategies that will deliver value tomorrow are manifest in stock price
today.
A rival stance in economic theory contends that short-termism can arise from two sources:
market myopia or managerial myopia. Market myopia occurs when investors fail to price shares
correctly due to informational asymmetry between managers and investors. For example,
managers may fear short-term market punishment for failure to meet quarterly earnings
expectations, and therefore might forego costly research and development (“R&D”) in order to
maintain current share price.149
Managerial myopia occurs when managers take opportunistic advantage of information
asymmetries favoring them. A manger’s decision may yield rewards that are optimal for them—
without regard to time horizon—though impair long-term shareholder value. Examples are
permanent boosts to a manager’s reputation or immediate bonuses from executing projects with
inferior long-term corporate payoffs.150
The law and economics literature on short-termism adds another source: impatience. Some
shareholders have immediate liquidity needs prompting them to sell.151 The effect is to rivet on
prevailing price rather than longer-term value. Again, under efficient market theory, this cannot
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occur, but under this rival theory such behavior can pressure managers to pursue short-term profits
at the expense of long-term investment.152
Since such liquidity effects arise only for impatient investors, legal scholars wondered
whether there are too many of them and what, if anything, corporate law might do about that.
Critics targeted shareholder activists, especially hedge funds specializing in that approach.
Opponents, while acknowledging some costs, stressed the gains in accountability and long-run
prosperity.153 Shareholders are the best incentivized participants to assure managerial
accountability, after all.154 Many are even better informed than corporate boards and therefore
likely to be effective in overseeing wayward managers.155 They develop expertise in governance
and strategy to provide superior solutions.
In the ensuing corporate law scholarship debate, contestants dispute the extent of the
empirical evidence on short-termism. Prominent among the empirical researchers is the work of
Professor Bushee—although not so much embracing his entire classification scheme as focusing
on his related research on the effects of a high density of transients in a shareholder base.156
In an often-cited work,157 Bushee found that “transient ownership creates incentives for
managers to sacrifice long-term investment to avoid a decline in current earnings.”158 He profiled
all companies positioned to reverse a year-on-year earnings decline by reducing R&D spending.
Companies with a high density of transients were significantly more likely to do so than those with
lower transient populations.
Professors Coffee and Palia attest to the significance of Professor Bushese’s work and the
long line of research that has followed and affirmed it. In their 2016 article on activism, for
example, they introduce the line of scholarship to “strongly suggest” that shareholder base
influences corporate time horizons.159 The authors note that Bushee’s research dates to 1998, and
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highlight two major articles, finding that companies with high transient density are (1) more prone
to earnings management such as R&D spending cuts and (2) more likely to be valued based on
near-term earnings rather than long-term earnings.160 They reference further studies affirming the
findings and adding that high transient density weakens shareholder oversight of managers and
adds pressure for near-term earnings over long-term value.161
Other participants in the horizon debate start by citing Bushee’s work as evidence of shorttermisn, before moving on to argue broader normative implications. For instance, Professor Dallas
challenges the shareholder value maximization norm because, per Bushee, short-term shareholders
pressure managers for short term results with related evidence of earnings management.162 For
another, Professor Millon, who elaborates on Bushee’s shareholder classification scheme more
fully, finds compelling evidence of short-termism to demand that corporations take greater social
responsibility.163
On the other side of the debate, many corporate law scholars find evidence of short-termism
too limited to warrant substantial legal or policy changes. Professor Fried, for one, says “only a
few” studies have found significant short-termism.164 Professors Bebchuk, Dent, and Roe all
separately arrived at similar conclusions.165 Despite that point, Fried says there’s no question that
short-term shareholder interests “are not perfectly aligned with [profit] maximization.”166
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If the empirical evidence is mixed,167 so are the realities: even if some activists have shortterm bias, they need support of a large bloc of other shareholders to influence corporate policy.168
Importantly, that group would be comprised of a diverse group of shareholders, including
transients, indexers and quality shareholders. Yet the literature in this debate tends to group all
such others under the broad umbrella of “institutional investors.”169
Amid such disagreement on the facts as to short-termism, corporate law scholars have
joined debate over the legal stakes. All participants agree that these are vast. At the most general
level, they pose the hoary corporate law question of allocation of power between directors and
officers on the one hand and shareholders on the other.170 Those who see short-termism as a serious
problem look to weaken shareholder power and strengthen managerial power; opponents, viewing
short-termism as at best an annoyance, worry about insulating managers from accountability.171
In play are all aspects of corporate governance, from proxy access and poison pills to voting
rules. During the course of the horizon debate, proponents of shareholder empowerment won many
victories, but so too did their opponents.172 Still up in the air are a variety of debated governance
devices, such as staggered boards, chairman/CEO roles, and shareholder voting—all of which are
considered later in this Article. These unresolved debates reflect how, to a significant degree, the
horizon debate has reached a stalemate, as the next Section shows. Adding quality shareholders to
the discussion could help unlock them, as the ensuing Section illustrates.
B. Status and Direction
For a snapshot of the current state of the horizon debate, consider the content of a major
2018 symposium on the subject, which Professor Tucker hosted.173 It featured a dozen rich and
original pieces, all making fascinating contributions, and sustaining attention on the relative virtues
and differences in time horizon. Indeed, a few delineated time horizon more finely or sought to
rephrase the horizon issue as whether a given time horizon accords with related risk assumed.174
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Some prescribed sweeping systemic steps to counteract short-termism for social benefit through
such innovations as federal savings accounts or universal equity funds175 or at the very least
designing executive pay to reward long-term performance.176
In a more skeptical contribution to the symposium, Professor de Fontenay detected a
tendency of debaters to imagine an ideal shareholder to measure others against.177 In the literature,
the ideal is vaguely reported as a “long-term” and “active monitor” but without much detail, de
Fontenay says, and for good reason, she adds: there is no such ideal. Rather, given both the
diversity of shareholders and the dynamic rate of change in capital markets, lawyerly interventions
to promote or retard particular shareholder types are doomed, she argues.
de Fontenay may be right, and the evidence in the horizon debate is mixed enough to
warrant caution. But the literature’s nearly-exclusive emphasis on horizon obscures the element of
relative concentration, whose inclusion might alter the case about whether there is such an ideal.
At minimum, further delineation of shareholder types based on conviction would help move the
debate forward.
Two empirical pieces in the symposium make such headway towards a more complete
picture. In one, Professors Sampson and Shi drew upon Bushee’s classification, finding evidence
that transients have a greater presence and quality shareholders (dedicated) a lesser presence over
the period from 1980-2013.178 These observations take into account both time and conviction.
While valuably delineating shareholder types, these scholars examined the implications for
national economic performance rather than for corporate governance.
In their contribution to the symposium, Professor Cremers and Sepe explicitly add relative
shareholder concentration to relative time horizons. They explain that accounts in the legal
literature tend to present investors in “dichotomic” terms, as always short-term or always longterm, while the truth is more complex, requiring “a more exact taxonomy of institutional investor
behavior along the two crucial dimensions of institutional investors’ investment horizons and
activism.”179 They conclude by mediating the horizon “debate’s “polarized rendering” in favor of
capturing “nuances that depend on a variety of factors” that the “law and economics literature has
paid relatively little attention to.”180
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This is a promising advance, although subtle and limited. It is so subtle, for instance, that
the innovation was not among those highlighted in the editor’s overview of the symposium.181 It
is limited in that the study uses conviction (“active share”) as a proxy for activism.182 Active share
is usually about investment concentration, however, not inclination or style of engagement.183 It
can be a partial proxy for activism, but concentration is a defining trait of quality (dedicated)
shareholders. A next step in the research would tease out, within the data, those shareholders with
high concentrations as well as long holding periods. That would be the quality shareholder
cohort.184 A few of the many implications of doing so are reviewed next.185
C. Policy Implications
Adding discussion of quality shareholders to the horizon debate would enable
distinguishing not merely short- versus long-term but long-term with or without concentration. To
illustrate how the addition would illuminate specific corporate law debates, consider two
controversial governance features: staggered boards and splitting versus combining the roles of
board chairman and CEO.
First, a longstanding sub-debate in corporate law considers the superiority of unitary versus
staggered boards. With unitary boards, all seats are filled in annual elections; with staggered
boards, each director serves a term of two or three years.186 Proponents of staggered boards stress
advantages such as continuity and institutional knowledge while critics cite insulation from
accountability.
Corporate law scholars, as well as major indexers, challenge staggered boards as
excessively pro-management. Professor Bebchuk has been an outspoken opponent of staggered
boards.187 Students at his law school mounted national campaigns to de-stagger boardrooms across
181
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corporate America.188 He and his colleagues marshalled impressive research data to contend that
staggered board reduced firm value.
In the other corner of this contentious debate stood Professor Cremers and his colleagues,
who mounted equally intense counterarguments and opposing data sets, showing that staggered
boards increased firm value. This camp of scholars, which included some judges and prominent
lawyers,189 argued for staggered boards as either a default rule or as a requirement.190
Recent scholarship challenges the reliability of both empirical sides of the argument,
contending instead that neither is right: whether a staggered board is good or bad depends on the
company.191 The attempt to settle this debate is another way of recasting the horizon debate in
more holistic terms. In some of the empirical work, and in much of the rhetoric—described as
“polemical”192—the board structure sub-debate was a microcosm of the horizon debate:
proponents of staggered boards urged long-term value against short-term interests while opponents
of staggered boards denied that they had a short-term focus.
In attempting to settle the debate, the scholars pointed to research myopia in the data. It
riveted too narrowly on horizon issues to the exclusion of many other factors that bear on firm
value. And firm value, recall, is something beheld differently by the wide variety of shareholder
types.193
Moreover, Cremers and Sepe disagree that the debate is settled.194 But they are also moving
helpfully forward to focus on shareholder time horizon as well as conviction. For example, in their
recent symposium article, they found a higher density of quality shareholders reduces, though only
slightly, the value of staggered boards.195 They say this might reflect that activists apply short-term
pressure.
But another explanation is that quality shareholders do not take a blanket approach to
staggered boards. The evidence suggests that quality shareholders may slightly favor companies
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with unitary boards, those with staggered boards nevertheless attract sizable quality shareholder
cohorts.196 Companies certainly continue to be divided on the right approach.197
The scholarly attempt to “settle” the board structure sub-debate is consistent with the views
of quality shareholders on such matters: context matters, and different companies need different
governance features. While on its face such an assertion seems obvious to make and easy to defend,
many scholars and most indexers—but not quality shareholders—have assumed that staggered
boards are always good or bad. Adding quality shareholders to the debate challenges that
assumption.
Second, consider ongoing debate over whether to split or combine the roles of chairman of
the board and CEO. Traditionally, the CEO held the board chairman role as well. But in recent
years, critics have challenged such a practice. Their theory is that boards elect and oversee the
CEO so having one person wear both hats creates a conflict. Yet that is only one vote on boards
with many independent directors, so any conflict can easily be neutralized.
Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both chairman and
chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split.198 Companies are about evenly
divided on the practice: about half the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine
them.199 For their part, quality shareholders appear to think about this case-by-case and, if
anything, slightly favor companies that combine rather than split the functions.200
Finally, consider a case study that illuminates the importance of both horizon and
conviction. Professors Jennifer Riel and Roger Martin of the University of Toronto profiled the
example of Unilever. In 2009, hoary old Unilever’s share turnover mapped that of other
multinationals, plagued by a large portion of shareholders with holding periods of less than one
year.201 To CEO Paul Polman, the high level of transients translated into urgent demands for
maximizing quarterly profits and daily share prices.
Such a capital markets outlook adversely affected operations, strategy, and reporting.
Unilever published quarterly earnings guidance, forming expectations among market watchers.
Then, to meet these expectations, division managers cut spending on R&D, information
technology, and capital projects.
Polman recognized this flawed strategy. He adopted new policies and clearly
communicated these to shareholders and the market. Unilever would cease quarterly guidance and
reporting. It would no longer seek to deliver maximum profits each quarter or year but would seek
consistent and sustained profits across multiple years. At first, the stock price dropped.
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But within two years, it recovered and continued to rise over the next eight years, in tandem
with sustained profits. In the process, transient shareholders were chased away, replaced by a
concentration of long-term holders. As of late 2017, not long before Polman retired, Unilever’s
largest 50 owners boasted an average holding period of seven years.
Many of these were quality shareholders, but a substantial cohort of indexers were among
202
them. In other words, Polman’s campaign was only half successful.
In 2018, after Unilever announced plans to move to an Amsterdam-only listing, rather than
maintain its longstanding dual listing in London, indexers howled. They wanted Unilever to retain
its London listing so that it would remain in their favored index. Unilever succumbed to their
pressure.
While doing so was consistent with seeking long-term shareholders, the move
compromised the other goal of attracting concentrated shareholders, those with conviction. Putting
horizon and conviction together is important in practice as well as in theory.
III. PORTFOLIO CONVICTION
Corporate law professors have begun to wade into their version of the hottest debate in
finance: passive versus active investing. As referenced at the end of Part I, the debate in finance
concerns the relative performance of these two broad approaches to investing.203 In corporate law,
the debate concerns the relative incentives and capacities of shareholders in these two broad
categories to cast informed votes on corporate matters. All participants in both debates face a huge
challenge: the two categories are not self-defining and the available tools to distinguish between
the categories are limited.
Passive usually refers to an investing strategy that buys all stocks in an index, without
requiring active decision making concerning which stocks to buy or sell, whereas active denotes
everything else. “Everything else” is a huge diverse category, however, encompassing countless
alternative investment strategies and styles—value, growth, momentum, chartist, quantitative.
Finance researchers deal with this problem by exploring, within “everything else,” any strategies
or styles that an investor could use systematically to outperform the market indexes. While that
delineation helps researchers to canvass more comprehensively, it may often exclude distinctive
strategies of quality shareholders who do not compare performance with annual benchmarks.204
In the nascent legal literature, moreover, the focus to date has been on the indexers,
especially the largest ones, and their incentives and capacities, rather than on exploring the various
alternative types and their incentives and capacities. For instance, a wave of current scholarship
focuses intensively on the incentives and capabilities of the three largest indexers, contrasting
those few firms with everything else dubbed “active.”205
While useful to gain insight into the major indexers, such a focus obscures the contributions
of rivals and muddies the meaning of any related policy implications. In particular, there is a big
difference between an “active” fund that is long- or short-term as between an active fund that is
202
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heavily concentrated (1 to 20 stocks), moderately concentrated (20 to 50) or somewhat diversified
(up to 100). While delineating every cohort for purposes of legal analysis may be more daunting
than hunting for market-beating results in finance, it is relatively easy and highly illuminating to
add the quality shareholder. This Part explores how to do so by incorporating perspectives on the
quality shareholder into the principal terms of evolving debate in corporate law scholarship about
index funds.
A. Theory and Debate
The business model of the large index funds is to develop a broad portfolio of securities,
minimize costs, and match the index. Compensation is based on size of the fund rather than
performance of the fund, the traditional approach in the investment management industry.
Accordingly, indexers strive to increase assets under management (AUM). Beyond that
description, corporate law scholars begin to disagree.
The disagreement starts with theory. Recall references to the course of corporate life during
the 20th century.206 The challenge of corporate life was bridging the separation of ownership from
control and the job of corporate law was to mitigate the agency costs that arise when strong
managers control companies with weak owners. The rise of institutional investors heralded a new
era where such agency costs would be vastly reduced. But experience has disappointed such hopes,
as institutional investors, holding funds for others, bring agency costs of their own.
Today’s scholarly disagreement concerns the magnitude of those costs and what corporate
law might do about it. Two main rival theories contend in portraying the index fund sector. One
account is the value maximization view. In this account, agency costs are real but modest, as funds
have requisite incentives to act on behalf of their investors to monitor investments to assure the
best outcomes for their investors. The rival view see as agency costs as large and forbidding, where
fund managers face offsetting personal incentives and lack economic incentives to invest in
stewardship to improve the performance of particular companies.
Both theories have a certain appeal. Both sides can point to evidence to support their
theories. All positions could be improved, however, by adding the perspective of quality
shareholders. The following reviews some leading theoretical positions on incentives of the largest
indexers, and related evidence, with notes adding the perspective of the quality shareholder.
1. Incentives
In a recent book-length article, Professors Bebchuk and Hirst make the case for an agency
cost theory of indexing among the largest such funds.207 To start, they identify several benefits
index fund managers may obtain from solicitude toward investee managers compared to what their
investors would prefer. These include: business relationships, avoiding triggering regulatory
duties that can arise from taking an adversarial stance such as securities disclosures, and
minimizing the risk of regulatory backlash by overplaying their hand against corporate America.
In another long article, Professors Fisch, Hamdani and Solomon-Davidoff, counter that
such incentives may be neutralized by fiduciary standards and moral norms.208 For their part,
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Professors Kahan and Rock add a reputational argument.209 They cite the public relations
campaigns mounted by leading industry figures, such as the letters directed to chief executives by
BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink.
Norms and reputational concerns may constrain behavior, but probably imperfectly and no
more than among other shareholder types. For instance, while the largest index funds and their
CEOs may have name recognition, that is not true of those who manage funds. In contrast, quality
shareholders often put their names on the door, write books, issue newsletters, speak at
conferences.210 They become well-known, showing substantial investment in reputation. Quality
shareholders form exclusive membership fraternities and even offer an examination-based
certification that is regarded as the toughest in the industry.211
On the other side of this debate, presenting the value maximization theory of the largest
indexers, stand Professors Kahan and Rock.212 In an intricate draft article, they offer an account of
the direct incentives index fund families have to increase the market capitalization of investees:
doing so increases AUM. To Kahan and Rock, incentives are measured by the increased fees that
follow from increases in AUM. They conclude: “the most important factor by far in determining
how much a fund adviser stands to gain from being informed is the size of the holdings.”213 On
that basis, they say the largest indexers—those with trillions in AUM—have the greatest
incentives.
Bebchuck and Hirst respond to Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis by focusing on individual
index fund managers.214 Their compensation is based on a tiny percentage of a fund’s AUM, so
increasing the value of a particular investee yields little gain for them.
Two more fundamental problems face the AUM thesis from a quality shareholder
perspective. First, quality shareholders do not measure themselves by the growth in size of their
investees but by their return on shareholders’ equity over long periods of time.215 Those may often
increase by virtue of a company shrinking in size, as through dividends, buybacks or spinoffs, not
growing market capitalization.216 Growth in AUM due to growth in investee market capitalization
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does not capture this source of incentives. The absence of such a baseline prevents a comparative
assessment of the incentives of the major indexers.
Second, Kahan and Rock’s AUM model lacks attention to the important variables included
in the research of Bushee and others.217 These are the variables that delineate the quality
shareholder cohort and define its incentives. In Bushee’s model, for example, they are average
percentage ownership of investees, the percentage of investees representing at least a 5% share of
the portfolio, and the average size of each investment.218 The incentives that arise from having
such high stakes in a company likely dwarf those of large indexers with relatively small stakes in
thousands of companies. Again, in any event, the AUM incentives model fails to offer a way to
compare the incentives of quality shareholders.
Professor Fisch and her co-authors offer a different account of indexes incentives to support
their theory of indexer value maximization.219 They think that indexers compete with other
indexers as well as with “active” funds.220 They say this competition gives indexers incentives to
improve investee corporate governance because such improvements remove the advantages of
stock picking. In other words, indexers try to outperform “active” rivals.
Bebchuk and Hirst doubt this creates indexer incentives to invest in stewardship.221 They
explain that people migrate from “active” to passive investing because of the observed difficulty
of funds beating market averages. Under this motivation, indexers compete for customers not with
active funds but with fellow indexers. True, “active” funds still manage substantial assets, because
some do beat their index benchmark, Bebchuk and Hirst theorize. That will remain so even if
indexer stewardship increases investee value. In fact, active investors with concentrated ownership
in given companies benefit more from indexer efforts targeted to improve such companies, hardly
creating indexer incentives to intervene.
Both Fisch’s thesis and the Bebchuk-Hirst response suffer from the same problems as
Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis: quality shareholders do not measure their performance against
annual index performance. Their incentives are entirely different, so such a theory of indexer
incentives is inapposite.
Kahan and Rock add another perspective on the incentives debate, one that inadvertently
touches on quality shareholders. While agreeing with Bebchuk and Hirst that indexers lack
incentives to compete with “active” funds for new business (“inflows”), they say concentrated
fund managers may have such incentives. Drawing on the finance literature,222 they estimate that
earnings in suboptimal projects, which may help a fund grow its AUM but not drive higher corporate returns
to shareholders.
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competitive funds may increase AUM via inflows by 1.3% for every point by which they beat a
benchmark index. At certain investment concentration levels, incentives to boost inflows are
stronger than those to increase AUM through investee growth alone, they say.
They instance a fund concentrating 3.5% of its portfolio in a single stock. That is the
average level among smaller funds, with AUM around $1.2 billion. For that cohort, inflow-based
incentives are 20% larger. On the other hand, they contrast a fund concentrating merely .5% in a
single stock—the average level for larger funds, with AUM around $736 billion. The difference
disappears. Overall, Kahan and Rock conclude, the inflow-based incentives of this cohort are
slight—low for the smaller firms and scant for the larger ones.223
But if you change the flawed assumption of AUM growth as an incentive for quality
shareholders and make some adjustments that are relevant to them, this approach offers some
promise. For example, consider medium-size quality shareholders—say with $25-50 billion in
AUM—and concentrated holdings in some companies of 5% to 10%. Even within the AUM-based
model, that could spell substantial inflow-based incentives. If also taking account of the actual
incentives of quality shareholders—long-term returns on investment and strong reputations among
constituents—their incentives could swamp those of the large indexers.224
Being explicit about the quality shareholder cohort, and its particular incentives that
indexers lack, would improve the theoretical debate over the relative incentives of indexers and
others to operate as informed shareholders. After all, many skeptics continue to doubt the
rationality of an indexer incurring costs of x to increase investee value knowing they would share
most of any gain with rivals, and net a tiny fraction of x.225 Kahan and Rock counter that the largest
three indexers have stronger incentives than “most” other institutional and all but the largest
individuals.226 Quality shareholders are certainly within the referenced population boasting
stronger incentives.
2. Capacity
Debate over indexer incentives leads directly to questions about their capacity for informed
shareholder conduct. While this aspect of the debate can be measured to some degree, scholars
view the same facts differently.
Participants agree that large indexers cast votes at more than 4,000 annual meetings adding
up to more than 30,000 proposals. Champions such as Kahan and Rock stress that most do not
matter and only a few dozen annually are important.227 They then ask if indexers have the
demonstrated capacity to handle those and the question answers itself.228
Fisch and her co-authors stress that the large volume of meetings and proposals endows
large indexers with substantial economies of scope—each vote produces knowledge useful in
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other votes.229 Critics counter that across so many votes, little study can possibly be made, so little
knowledge can possibly accrue.230
Fisch embraces the widely-publicized commitment these funds made to increase their
stewardship staffs.231 But Bebchuk and Hirst find the results underwhelming.232 They compare
staff size—after the vaunted increases—in relation to the number and size of companies to be
followed. Among the largest indexers: BlackRock doubled its stewardship staff to 45; Vanguard
has 21 people; and State Street 12. Yet these indexers have holdings in more than 11,000
companies each worldwide, and at least 3,000 in the U.S. alone.
In dollar terms, total stewardship investment by these big indexers is a miniscule fraction
of their budgets: about $13.5 million, $6.3 million, and $3.6 million, respectively, all less than
one-fifth of 1%– only 0.2%—of total fees and expenses. Even if the staff focused only on the
largest companies—say where their stakes exceed $1 billion, that still adds to hundreds of
companies. They could only devote two to four person-days per year studying that small portion
of their total portfolio.
The following table starkly presents the picture:
Indexers’ Limited Stewardship Stakes233
BlackRock
Vanguard
Stewardship Staff
45
21
Investees Worldwide
11,246
13,225
Investees U.S.
3,765
3,672
Maximum Person Day
<4
<2

SSGA
12
12,191
3,117
<2

Stewardship Expense
Total Fees & Expenses

$3.6M
$2.6B

$13.5M
$9.1B

$6.3M
$3.5B

For context, consider the head count at two other companies involved in investment
analysis. Moody’s, the bond rating agency covering a large swath of capital markets, employs
12,000 people. Among the largest quality shareholders, Capital Research, which keeps up with a
far smaller portfolio of companies, 7,500.
Bebchuk and Hirst find it hard to believe that the limited resources of the large indexers
suffice to yield informed opinions on the tens of thousands of shareholder decisions required of an
owner of shares in many thousands of companies. Even if Kahan and Rock are right that most are
quotidian and few grave, Bebhcuk and Hirst say at least a significant portion would require some
knowledge that would entail reading the annual report and proxy statement, determining the
company’s strategic plan and past performance, components of its executive compensation plans,
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and pending shareholder and management proposals. Yet the evidence indicates that the big
indexers access only 29% of governance related public filings of their investees.234
Fisch and her colleagues stress the extensive private engagement in which the large
indexers say they are heavily engaged.235 Bebchuk and Hirst probe the data to find the probabilities
and public record pointing to inherent limitations. From 2017 through 2019, the largest indexers
reported having multiple annual engagements with only a handful of their investees—3.9% at
Blackrock, 2.3% at Vanguard, and 0.6% at State Street; they had just one engagement with another
7.2%, 3.5%, and 5.0%, respectively.236 In other words, over a recent three-year period, these firms
had no engagement with the overwhelming majority of the companies they invest in.
The implication of the current debate may be that indexer critics would prefer the rest of
the investment community—the group so often dubbed “active” without delineation—to seize
power in the shareholder voting arena. But at least for Bebchuk and Hirst, that is not the case. They
see high agency costs across the investment community.237 The upshot of their critique for them
is to create incentives to induce indexers to engage more and become more active. But there is
more to the debate, concerning the indexers’ favored approach of using formulaic guidelines to
cast votes, and how different that is from the quality shareholder approach.
B. Guideline Best Practices
All the major indexes, as well as two leading specialist companies that advise the rest of
the institutional investor market on shareholder voting, publish guidelines on their views of
corporate best practices. Rather than examining each vote in the context of a particular company,
these guidelines promote certain precepts for all companies: splitting the roles of board chairman
and CEO, annual rather than staggered terms for directors, and simple majority shareholder voting.
Scholars have different views on what this approach says about the indexers.
Critics say it reflects the thin staffing that would prevent firms from reaching an informed
opinion for each particular company. Just as the large indexers are stretched thin, so too are the
two main proxy advisers,. ISS and Glass Lewis. Both operate with lean staffs on low budgets, and
just 1,000 employees at ISS and 1,200 at Glass Lewis. Yet they address a huge market: ISS boasts
1,700 institutional clients while Glass Lewis’s clients together manage $35 trillion in assets.238
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Their small crews opine on hundreds of thousands of separate decisions annually—ISS addresses
40,000 annual meetings and Glass Lewis 20,000.239
In contrast, proponents of indexers treat the guideline approach as an efficient
demonstration of economies of scope.240 Kahan and Rock theorize that the indexers have a special
advantage concerning broad market wide issues to which the guidelines speak, such as the relative
appeal of staggered boards.241 They acknowledge, however, that other investors may have an
advantage when it comes to firm-specific issues such as a given director’s fit for a particular board.
Of course, few issues are purely firm-specific or purely issue-specific, but they think the degree of
importance varies and can delineated.242
One concern with the guideline method, however, is it condones a once-size-fits-all
approach to corporate governance. While Kahan and Rock deny holding any such view,243 others
come closer to countenancing it. For example, Fisch and colleagues say indexers compete by
“engaging in broad-based efforts to improve the overall performance of the market, addressing
cross-cutting issues such as corporate governance, risk management, cybersecurity and
sustainability.”244 That is notable for its suggestion that, rather than trying to maximize the
prosperity of each given company in the index, indexers seek to get the highest market return.
In developing their theory of the value indexers add to corporate governance, Fisch and
colleagues cited several empirical finance articles showing an association between high indexer
density in a shareholder base and various governance features the indexers favor, such as more
independent directors, fewer takeover defenses and equalized shareholder voting rights.245 But
The 12,000-person workforce at Moody’s, conducting comparable coverage in scope, is ten to
twelve times these; the Capital Group team of 7,500, covering a fraction of the scope, is four to seven times
as large.
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Bebchuk and Hirst pointed out an uncited subsequent paper reporting similar research revealing
that such high indexer density is associated with certain reforms indexers disfavor, such as CEOs
becoming chairman.246
No issue is so generic as to be universal—not even the ritualistic shareholder ratification
of an auditor of the company’s financial reports.247 The same is true for a wide variety of guideline
practices whose utility and value varies by company and is heavily debated in the literature.248
That’s certainly the quality shareholder view. Among the best illustrations of the stakes and the
different approaches between indexers and quality shareholders concerns the central nervous
system of corporate life: directors and boards, discussed next.
C. Directors and Boards
Corporate law puts boards of directors at the center of corporate governance.249 Corporate
law empowers shareholders to elect directors. It is perhaps the shareholders’ most consequential
decision. Yet approaches to this critical issue vary widely between indexers and quality
shareholders. It would illuminate the indexing debate to compare and contrast these two
approaches. The following first reviews the formulaic approach of the indexer guidelines and
second the analytical approach of the quality shareholder.250
1. Indexer Guidelines
Consider the approach of the leading proxy adviser, Institutional Shareholder Service
(ISS). ISS opens its discussion of the board of directors not with statements of competence or
corporate stewardship, but with “four fundamental principles [that] apply when determining votes
on director nominees.”251 These are enumerated as independence, composition, responsiveness
and accountability. Only the assessment of “responsiveness” is contextual—voting “case-bybase.”
On independence, ISS makes three prescriptions: (1) a majority of directors must be
independent; (2) the board must have three standing committees operating under formal charters
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and staffed only with independent directors—audit, compensation, and nominating; and (3) there
must either be a lead independent director or an independent chairman (not also serving as an
executive officer).
Many such rules have become commonly accepted in recent decades, but the empirical
evidence on their economic value remains inconclusive.252 Consider the issue of director
independence.253 Some evidence suggests a board’s independence is less important than its active
engagement.254 Other evidence suggests that certain kinds of outside directors improve the
performance of certain functions, such as adherence to accounting requirements.255 But, clearly,
there is a trade-off between the expertise of inside directors and the independence of outside
directors.256
On composition, ISS again states three rules: (1) directors should have diverse skills that
add value to the board, rather than duplicating backgrounds from particular viewpoints, ideally
presented in a graphical skills matrix to illustrate; (2) regular meeting attendance is expected,
defined as at least 75% of meetings of the full board and committees; and (3) attention is expected,
determined by caps on the number of public company boards individual directors may serve—five
in general or two for CEOs. 257
Critics challenge these composition directives as intrusive and formulaic. Taking (2) and
(3) first, attendance and attention are clearly necessary, but not sufficient, to determine a valuable
board member. Rules of thumb are useful, but that’s not how these rules operate. That is why the
board of directors’ section of so many corporate websites portray check marks ticking off all the
governance formulas that major indexers and proxy advisors champion. Attention is important,
but caps are clearly arbitrary.258
On accountability, ISS calls for regular director elections, opposes staggered terms, and
believes in shareholder removal power, with or without cause. But state corporate law permits all
these and many other approaches to director election and removal, and leaves it to companies to
choose those best suited for their circumstances. As we have seen, there are good arguments to
evaluate these on a case-bay-case basis.259
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2. Comparing Quality
Warren Buffett has often expressed his views on ideal directors and boards—ideas that
have a wide following among the rest of the quality shareholder cohort.260 They seek directors
with a shareholder orientation, business savvy, and interest in the particular company and its
stewardship.261 Particular director traits and the specific context of a given company are more
important than following general formulas or perceived best practices.
The number-one question quality shareholders want to know about any director candidates,
however, is whether they are shareholder oriented. That is, all directors should act as if there is a
single absentee owner and do everything reasonably possible to advance that owner’s long-term
interest.262
This is not a mandate for the immediate maximization of shareholder value, but rather a
mentality to evaluate every decision from the shareholder perspective. To that end, it is desirable
for directors to buy and hold sizable personal stakes in companies they serve, so that they truly
walk in the shoes of owners.263
The board’s most important job is selecting an outstanding CEO. If the board secures an
outstanding CEO, it will likely face few other major problems. All CEOs must be measured
according to a set of performance standards. A board’s outside directors must formulate these
standards and regularly evaluate the CEO in light of them—without the CEO being present.264
Standards should be tailored to the particular business culture but should stress
fundamental baselines, such as returns on shareholder capital and progress in market value per
share over multiple years. Above all, directors should evaluate the CEOs record on capital
allocation measured against a hurdle rate it sets.265
If the CEO’s performance persistently falls short of the standards set by the directors, then
the board must replace the CEO. The same goes for all other senior managers boards oversee, just
as an intelligent owner would if present.
In addressing these problems, the director’s actions must be fair, swift, and decisive.
Directors who perceive a managerial problem should immediately alert other directors to the issue.
If enough are persuaded, concerted action can be readily coordinated to resolve the problem.
Here, too, shareholders can play a role. Companies can make their directors available to

prescribes that each board undertake regular performance reviews of itself. This is another fashion in
corporate governance that is reinforced by consulting firms offering the service Christopher D. McKenna,
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their largest long-term quality shareholders.266 These representatives can discuss issues put to
shareholder votes that affect enduring value. A few influential quality shareholders, acting together,
can effectively reform a given company’s corporate governance simply by withholding their votes
for directors who were tolerating odious behavior.
On board committees, finally, corporate law requires that boards approve major
acquisitions and dividends, and as a practical matter to approve share buyback programs.267 Along
with such approvals, good practice dictates that the board’s principal role is setting applicable
hurdle rates, for reinvestment and acquisitions.
Companies wishing to make capital allocation a priority could consider whether to create
a board committee with this oversight. At S&P 500 companies, boards maintain an average of four
committees, and about 1/3 include a committee on capital allocation, finance or investment.268
Charters might call for post-investment reviews on all important allocations, especially organic
growth initiatives, acquisitions, and share buybacks.
With capital allocation being the central driver of business value, from the quality
shareholders’ analytical perspective, it is natural that this cohort would discuss the idea of a board
committee on the subject. The indexer guidelines, of course, do not.
3. A Note on Activists
A turn to the subset of quality shareholder who go activist is in order. Activist shareholders
regularly identify and recruit able director nominees to serve on boards of corporations they target.
These director nominees are often experts in the relevant industry or on aspects of perceived board
weaknesses, such as corporate governance. They may often be the kinds of directors quality
shareholders would seek and nominate themselves. But the context where such nominations arise
can compromise actual or perceived stewardship.
First, there is longstanding concern that directors appointed as the result of activist support
will be more beholden to the activist than to the other shareholders. This concern is constrained
somewhat by a director’s fiduciary duties, which require acting for the corporation, not any
particular shareholder.
But circumstances can aggravate the problem. For instance, some activists have offered
their nominees bonuses for achieving stated corporate results during their tenure, including certain
stock price levels. Such “golden leashes,” as they are called, increase the risk that the director is
beholden to the sponsor.
In addition, a payout set based on stock price could influence important business
judgments, such as optimal borrowing levels and whether to make or accept acquisition offers. For
these reasons, special bonuses for certain directors risk creating board factions and infighting.
Second, when appointed as the result of a settlement, outside normal governance
procedures, the other shareholders did not get a vote. Such arrangements can lead to board
members that appeal unduly to the activist and incumbents.
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One solution to this problem is to put settlements to votes of the other shareholders.269 This
would assure appointment of directors with consensus support, as well as validate any other aspects
of the settlement, such as committee assignments, director removal, terms and term limits and
corporate governance guidelines.270
●●●●●
The indexing debate over incentives, capacity, and “guideline” approach to governance is
vital. It can be enriched by adding the perspective of the quality shareholder. All of this matters,
above all, because of the increasingly important role shareholders play in corporate governance.
The frequency and significance of shareholder voting and the fragmentation of shareholder types
is what leads to ultimate debates in corporate law concerning shareholder voting, to which we turn
next.
IV. SHAREHOLDER VOTING
State corporate law requires corporations to submit certain matters to a shareholder vote.271
These matters include election and removal of directors, by-law or charter amendments, mergers,
substantial asset divestments, and dissolution.272 Federal securities law supplements these state
laws by regulating the process of shareholder voting,273 and sometimes requiring votes, most
notably on executive compensation.274 Managers or shareholders can make additional proposals
calling for a shareholder vote, on topics ranging from interested transactions to disclosures about
climate change.275
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State corporate law provides that each corporate share is entitled to one vote on all such
matters, unless a company’s charter adopts a different rule.276 State law permits a wide variety of
alternative voting regimes, including several classes of shares with different voting rights; shares
without votes or with multiple votes; as well as shares that accrue votes when held for long periods
or that enjoy fewer votes when held by a large block owner.277 Although federal securities laws
defer almost entirely to state corporate law on voting rules, stock exchange rules limit some of this
variation, at least for companies already listed.278
While state corporate law grants vast power to boards of directors to oversee and manage
a corporation,279 these shareholder voting rules give shareholders a significant voice on many
consequential issues. In recent years, the number and importance of matters submitted for
shareholder voting have both increased.280 Fragmentation of the shareholder base has accentuated
the importance of shareholder voting, as this is the favored route for shareholder activists to shape
corporate policy and an occasion when indexers wield their power. These forces have combined
to produce experimentation with alternative voting arrangements.
Although the baseline voting rule remains one share one vote, more companies have
switched to alternatives and debate has ensued.281 In this debate, the traditional rule is heralded as
a democratic gold standard, against which all alternatives must be measured. This Part reviews
the three alternatives that have attracted the most attention: dual class, tenured, and exclusionary,
putting each in context, and assessing the pros and cons.
The review leads logically to a novel alternative, which I propose, that increases the power
of long-term committed owners—quality shareholders. I dub this regime “quality voting.” Besides
logical closure in relating the relevant elements of the debate to voting rules, quality voting will
appeal to companies interested in attracting higher densities of quality shareholders.
A. Dual Class: Anti-Activist
The one-share, one-vote regime is easiest to conceptualize and implement in a company
with a single class of stock outstanding. Every share of that class has one vote, and all other
shareholder rights are the same, as to matters such as dividends or liquidation rights. But state
corporate law has long permitted companies to have more than one class of stock, with variable
voting and other rights, so long as the rights of each class are the same within the class.282 This
approach is valuable to enable issuing preferred stock, for instance, a security that blends features
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of common equity with debt.283
While allowable under state corporate law, maintaining two classes of common stock has
sparked controversy since at least 1925. The details of each dual class structure vary, but the
general design grants greater voting power to one class than to the other. Participants all see a
trade-off between the increased incentives of those with the greater voting power to make value
enhancing decisions and the decreased monitoring capability of those with lesser voting power.
People disagree, often strongly, about the net effects of the trade-off. This Section charts the
regulatory path of this debate back to 1925 through today, stressing how a greater emphasis on the
distinctive role that quality shareholders play would add to this debate.
1. Law and Practice
In a famous 1925 offering, Dodge Brothers, Inc. adopted two classes of stock, with
different voting rights.284 One class had multiple votes per share while the other had the usual one
vote per share. A public howl of protest erupted, as the era’s populists condemned the lopsided
arrangement. Critics observed that the owner of the high-vote stock held shares worth only $2.25
million in a company with a market value of $130 million—yet controlled a majority of the voting
power.
In this era, such matters were governed entirely by state corporation law, though this
episode contributed to the forces leading to enacting of federal securities laws in 1933 along with
exploring how stock exchange listing rules could supplement state corporate law.285 The real issue
with such dual class capital structures is that they vest control in a group without matching
economic risks: despite equal investments, one class has more votes per share than the other. The
controlling class is insulated from short term pressure but also from accountability.
In the aftermath of the Dodge Brothers offering, the stock exchanges barred listing of new
companies using multiple classes of stock. That ban remained in effect through 1985. The New
York Stock Exchange granted a few waivers, with conditions, particularly when founders showed
having special skills or vision warranting such enhanced power.286 Other exchanges, such as
Nasdaq, also banned dual class subject to conditions such as a minimum portion of minority board
seats, a maximum ratio of control shares to minority shares, and anti-dilution protections.
In the late 1980s, the dual class structure’s voting arrangement captured newfound public
attention after many boards began to use it defeat unwanted tender offer bids.287 In a common
practice, a company facing a threat to control would recapitalize by offering to replace one existing
class of stock with two new classes. One of the new classes offered low voting rights but high
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dividends while the other offered the reverse.288
As board’s making such an offering intended, managers and other pro-management
shareholders traded their shares for the high vote class while public shareholders, preferring cash
dividends to abstract voting rights, went for the low vote class. While state corporate law allowed
such a gambit, the SEC regarded the practice as coercive. In 1989, it adopted a federal rule
prohibiting stock exchanges from listing companies proposing dual class capital structures.289
A federal court struck the SEC’s rule on administrative grounds.290 But the exchanges
nevertheless adopted the listing rules, and they remain in effect.291 These rules apply to existing
companies, barring recapitalizations, but not to newly-listed companies with dual class structures
upon initial public offerings (IPOs). Dual class structures have been particularly appealing to new
listings for technology companies, with a wave of such offerings occurring in the mid-2000s as
the tech sector rallied and again in the last few years since 2017. Today, some 250 companies
maintain dual class capital structures.292
2. Debate and Data
In the longstanding debate, proponents of dual class argue that entrepreneurs need to retain
voting control to protect their companies from intense, short-sighted pressure of activist
shareholders. The reasoning follows, however, that the founder’s “special sauce” offers initial
value, but tends to fade with time and depends on consistent personal engagement.
More recently, debate has come to focus on duration: people could accept the structure as
long as it wasn’t permanent.293 The question being asked was: how long would the dual class terms
endure and under what circumstances might they cease? Before 2000, nearly two-thirds of dual
class offerings had no sunset provisions. But expiration terms have become common, whether at
fixed times such as five to ten years or upon events such as the founder’s death or incapacity.294
Despite such compromises, extreme cases arise that lead to extreme reactions. Take the
2017 IPO of Snap Inc., whose public shares carried no voting rights. Many observers
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fulminated.295 Some campaigned for the SEC or stock exchanges to ban the practice.296 Although
authorities refrained, advocates persuaded certain market index compilers to exclude such
companies from their indexes,297 adding a new force in corporate governance.298
Advocates for dual class take a different view. As Professor Lund explains, the debate over
nonvoting stock—and dual class generally—pits critics concerned that the approach impairs
accountability against proponents who stress the long-term value.299 She then explored how such
capital structures segment the shareholder base into informed and uninformed investors. Informed
investors are better motivated to support optimal governance for long-term value, and may even
pay a premium to own higher-voting stock. Companies catering to different shareholder types with
such tailored share offerings therefore increase firm value, she says.300
Turning to the evidence, it does not support a flat ban on dual class structures nor a
universal endorsement of them. First, despite being excluded from some indexes, many companies
continue to offer them and many shareholders continue to buy them.301 The number and percentage
of newly listed companies with dual class structures has not changed much302—though the total
market capitalization of such companies has fallen substantially.303 The frequency and duration of
sunset provisions has not moved much either—about 1/5 of new dual class structures continue to
have sunsets, typically after ten years.
Second, many dual class structures are carefully tailored to suit individual corporate and
shareholder circumstances. For example, about 15 companies use complex formulas to allocate
corporate power and another 15 provide for specific allocations of board seats, some by number
of slots and others by percentage.304 Several adjust the voting rules on extraordinary matters such
295
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as mergers, either reducing the super-voting shares to one vote or increasing the other class to one
vote.305
Third, and most important for this Article’s thesis: quality shareholders often embrace
companies with dual class structures. Among companies with dual class structures, most attract a
high density of quality shareholders.306 One reason for this appetite, particularly in contrast to the
indexers’ universal condemnation: a categorial condemnation of dual class capital structures
ignores their utility in specific scenarios.307
In fact, one leading voice in the quality shareholder community publishes an investment
advisory entitled “index orphans.”308 It highlights investment opportunities among excellent
companies expelled from the indexes for various reasons, including thanks to having dual class
structures.
As this evidence suggests, debates over the merits of dual class would benefit by
considering views of the quality shareholder cohort.
B. Tenured Voting: Anti-Transient
Scholars whose normative goal is to encourage long-term share ownership have recently
advocated for increasing the voting power of long-held shares. This concept—synonymously
called tenured voting, time-weighted voting or time-phased voting—prescribes that a share’s
voting power is increased after it has been held for a given number of years.
A common approach grants four votes instead of one to each share held longer than four
years. When those shares are sold, they revert back to one-vote shares. Designs vary to suit, with
differences in the definitions of short and long term (upping votes after three, five or ten years
say), reward increments (adding one vote per two years or two votes per one year), and matters
covered (all matters coming to a vote or only designated matters, such as mergers).309
In theory, by rewarding long-term ownership, average holding periods should rise and
stock volatility fall. From the shareholders’ viewpoint, tenured voting remains as democratic as
one-share, one-vote: all shares and shareholders enjoy identical opportunities to gain enhanced
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voting rights.310
A major and underappreciated problem, however, is that holding period length is an
imperfect proxy for wisdom or good judgment.311 After all, if long-term shareholders are indexers
with insufficient interest in particular companies while newer shareholders are prepared to engage
productively, tenured voting backfires.312
While the emerging literature is increasingly robust, most of the analysis has focused on
the horizon effects of tenured voting, with limited attention to this issue of conviction. This subsection reviews the prevailing literature while stressing that an equal emphasis on conviction
should inform debate over tenured voting.
1. Law and Theory
Unlike dual class, only a dozen U.S. public companies have ever adopted tenured voting,
though laws in France and Italy since 2014 have required it for many public companies there.313
As a result, far less scholarly attention had been paid to tenured voting, until recent years.314
Interest in tenured voting was sparked by a series of major articles led by Lynne Dallas, appearing
in 2012, 2016 and 2017.315 Since then, in addition to numerous passing references, two important
articles on shareholder cultivation treated the innovation carefully316 and two more recent articles
take the topic up head on.317
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Most of this literature reviews the legal authority to permit tenured voting. These discuss
state corporation law as well as stock exchange listing rules—the federal securities laws having
virtually no role since the SEC’s aborted flirtation with intervening in the dual class context.318
The consensus is overwhelming that state corporation law, certainly in the leading state of
Delaware, authorizes this and many other variations of voting arrangements.319
Two landmark cases support this consensus conclusion, one by analogy and one directly.
In the analogy case, Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker320 upheld a scaled voting scheme where
voting power varied with a shareholders’ stake—in this case, the greater the stake, the lower the
voting power.321 Plaintiffs challenged the scheme under a state corporate statute requiring uniform
voting powers by class.322 In rejecting this challenge, the court reasoned that the provision applied
equally to every share, and thus was uniform as to shares, and operated unevenly only as to those
shareholders crossing certain ownership levels.323
The other landmark case, Williams v. Geier,324 directly upheld a proposed tenured voting
structure. Existing shares won ten votes per share. Upon their transfer, they would revert to one
vote per share, and newly issued shares would also have one vote per share—but all those held 36
months would accrue ten votes. The court considered the board’s proposal to be an ordinary
business judgment, entitled to utmost judicial deference.325
If scholars agree that the case law clearly upholds tenured voting, there is more debate
about whether stock exchange listing rules restrict it. Scholars routinely point to the New York
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et al., supra note 4, at 999 (“The scaled voting structure in Providence & Worcester is analogous to tenure
voting, simply substituting the limiting factor of holding duration for holding size.”) Its holding squarely
covers one of the features that could be used to define quality voting, as discussed in Section D.
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Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (also overruling a New York federal district court
that purported to reject the validity of tenured voting under Delaware law, Unilever Acquisition Corp. v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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The plan was neither a defensive measure, under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985), requiring elevated scrutiny for reasonableness as the trial court had held, nor an
infringement on the shareholder franchise, under Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988), requiring enhanced scrutiny as the plaintiffs had urged.
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Stock Exchange listing rule on voting rights which, by its terms, prevents a listed company from
switching to tenured voting.326
But three qualifications have been made: Professor Belinfanti notes that stock exchange
interpretive guidelines could warrant a waiver for a company with rational business concerns about
short-termism;327 Professor Rock views any such impediment to recognized alternative voting
regimes as ill-advised;328 and Professors Berger et al. believe that the reasoning in Providence
should apply to the interpretation of the NYSE rules to permit tenured voting.329
As a matter of corporate policy, two corporate law scholars have recognized tenured voting
as a valid method of shareholder cultivation for companies seeking a longer-term base. Belfanti
opines: “As a cultivation tool, it rewards stewardship capital on one hand, and potentially
discourages . . . flippers and short-term gamblers.”330 Rock stresses incentives: “it provides greater
incentives to longer-term shareholders to invest in making those decisions and greater incentive to
remain shareholders to enjoy the increased voting rights.”331 Rock refrains from opining on
whether this would be desirable or not, however, noting downsides.332 On balance, though, Rock
favors the flexibility offered:
In an age of empowered shareholders, in which firms should think about
selecting and shaping an optimal shareholder base, prohibiting a key design tool is
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E.g., Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 903, quoting NYSE listing rule:
Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock . . . cannot be
disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance. Examples of
such corporate action or issuance include, but are not limited to, the adoption of time
phased voting plans, the adoption of capped voting rights plans, the issuance of super
voting stock, or the issuance of stock with voting rights less than the per share voting rights
of the existing common stock through an exchange offer.
NYSE Manual, § 313.00(A). The NACD has a similar counterpart.
327

Belinfanti, Cultivation, supra note 62, at p 834 (quoting NYSE listed company manual: "[t]he
Exchange's interpretations under will be flexible, recognizing that both the capital markets and the
circumstances and needs of listed companies change over time") (citing para. 313.00 Interpretation No. 9501, N.Y. Stock Exch. (Jan. 10, 1995), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/pdf/voting rights.pdf).
328

Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 903.

329

Berger et al., supra note 4, at 319-320 (rule forbids “disparately” reducing voting rights whereas
switching to a tenured voting is non-disparate because equally applicable to all shares held for stated
durations). Edelman et al. are not so sure and say they are not aware of any company that has done so.
Edelman, et al, supra note 4, at 1002-1003 (“The NYSE voting rights policy precludes companies from
adopting tenure voting plans for existing shares. . . . most commentators agree that listing rules allow the
adoption of tenure voting at only the IPO stage.”).
330

Belinfanti, Cultivation, supra note 62, at 843.

331

Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 901-902.

Downsides are the “inverse of the upsides,” including cementing insider control despite small
stakes. Another is this caution: “if long-term shareholders are typically index funds who, in competing on
price, resist portfolio firm-specific investments.” Rock, supra note 78, at 902. This is an important caution
about how a voting regime focused on horizon can be impaired by a problem of conviction. It is an example
of the importance of combining both horizon and conviction in a single analysis as well as the need to
recognize that not all long-term shareholders are “typically index funds.” Many are quality shareholders.
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inappropriate. [F]irms and shareholders should at least have the option to
experiment with different ways of shaping the shareholder base.333
2. Research and Data
The research that reignited interest in tenured voting began with Professors Dallas, whose
2017 work with Professor Berry investigated its implications for corporate governance and effects
on managerial myopia.334 The article’s main points were a policy view of tenured voting and an
examination of the dozen U.S. companies that have tried it. They considered three rationales for
tenured voting: increasing power of long-term shareholders; encouraging longer hold periods;
nudging corporate culture towards a long-term value focus.335
The study found that the plans did not reduce managerial myopia by lengthening
shareholder holding periods.336 Nor did it affect institutional ownership or increase long-term
ownership, which actually decreased. They found that, like dual class, tenured voting increased
the wedge between ownership and control, as insiders could sell shares over time while
maintaining voting power. The increased agency costs were not offset by a greater long-term
focus.337 Despite these findings, the authors encouraged continued experimentation with tenured
voting, stressing almost exclusively its implications concerning horizon, rather than conviction.
More recently, Professor Berger and co-authors propose tenured voting as a way to address
short-termism, presenting it as a better alternative to dual-class.338 They approach the prescription
principally in terms of time horizon, stressing perceived short-termism from shortening average
holding periods and increased activism.339 They argue that tenured voting creates incentives to
hold for long periods, reduces short-term myopia, attracts long-term capital, and promotes a longterm corporate culture.340
Amid the authors’ impassioned entreaties focused on time horizon, there is only limited
attention to conviction, and none to the quality shareholder. On the subject of conviction, the
scholars say only that tenured voting should not be expected to attract any additional indexers to a
shareholder base. That is true, of course, because indexers do not make investment decisions based
on such firm-specific governance features.
Most recently, Professor Edelman and his co-authors were motivated by concerns that
tenured voting can entrench management.341 So they analyzed its likely effect in a contested board
333
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Id. at 903-904.
Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 551.
Id. at 570-571.
Id. at 620-21.
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Id. at 611-12.
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Berger et al., supra note 4, at 297.
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Id. at 298-300.
Id. at 307-09.
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Id. at 297. This concern appears particularly strong in Italy, where critics express concern that
the intention to elongate shareholder time horizons can also entrench managerial tenures. Chiara Mosca,
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded for Loyalty? European Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured
Voting and Takeover Law, 8 Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 245 (2019) (“tenured voting rights
disappoint their expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long termism”). Such regimes do
not increase the level of engagement of passive indexers. See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds
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election. Their model recognizes additional tenured voting power in incumbents, less voting power
in the hands of an activist new to ownership, and variable voting power among the variety of other
shareholders. (The model did not distinguish among varying levels of concentration or
diversification.) They made two major findings.
First, when insiders of a company adopting tenured voting own and keep a sizable block—
20% to 30%—that proves a formidable deterrent to even their most committed opponents who
might seek to acquire voting control. Second, if such insiders instead sold down to a point where
majority voting power fell into institutional investor hands, the tenured voting mechanisms no
longer protect the insiders’ control.
The upshot, for the authors, is to view tenured voting as a reasonable compromise between
one-share/-one-vote and dual class, in that it grants incumbent inside controls an edge but only if
they maintain substantial skin in the game. Given that finding, it would also be interesting to
investigate the further effects of granting additional voting power based on conviction—more
votes to concentrated than to diversified shareholders. We move to that in Section D; first consider,
briefly, current proposals to sterilize the votes of index funds.
C. Variations: Anti-Indexer
Corporate law scholars have identified numerous concerns about indexers casting
shareholder votes, ranging from limited monitoring capabilities to incentives to favor managers,
as discussed in Part III. Calls to eliminate or curtail related shareholder voting rights ensue. All
focus on indexer passivity—lack of conviction—rather than time horizon.
Professor Lund proposes for index funds to abstain from voting altogether—contrary to
current law which requires large institutional investors to cast their ballots.342 The rationale is that
indexers, based on the critical evidence summarized in Part III, lack requisite incentives or capacity
to become informed about corporate voting. The effect would increase the voting power of quality
shareholders as well as all non-indexers, whatever their time horizons or other attributes.343
Professors Bebchuk and Hirst oppose Lund’s proposals for two reasons. First, despite their
criticism of indexers outlined in Part III, that does not lead them to think that the voting decisions
of other investors are superior. Their main criticism here, however, lumps all non-indexers (and
non-managers) together without separately recognizing the quality shareholder cohort.
Instead, they single out “individual retail investors,” as lacking requisite incentives to
become informed,344 and “active mutual fund managers,” as not having shown superior investment
in becoming informed compared to indexers.345 Attention to quality shareholders might change
this analysis.
Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 San Diego L. Rev. 803
(2018).
342

Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); see
also Todd M. Henderson & Dorothy S. Lund, Index Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate
Governance, Wall Street J. (June 22, 2017).
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Lund, at 528-530. An alternative would focus on the perceived pro-management bias of index
funds and allocate indexers’ votes in proportion to the votes of non-management non-indexers. See id. at
530-31.
344

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2218 n. 227.

345

Id., n. 228.
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A second form of anti-indexer voting measures would require the funds to pass their voting
rights through to the beneficial owners of the fund.346 This likewise seeks to remedy the limited
incentives and capacity the fund has to cast informed votes. Bebchuk and Hirst again disagree,
here for three reasons, most of which are valid, though they could benefit from delineating the
shareholder base further. As they stand, the objections are almost entirely concerned with
individual fund beneficiaries, when indexers also manage assets for many different kinds of
institutions (if not quality shareholders).347
The logical next step after these criticisms—and all three pending debates over shareholder
voting regimes—is quality voting, an approach that zeroes in on two behaviors all participants
seem to laud: shareholders with a long-term horizon and high level of conviction.
D. Quality Voting: Pro-Quality
To recap this Part so far, dual class voting structures are motivated by entrepreneurs averse
to shareholder activism or other short-term pressures, though their own economic stakes are not as
concentrated; tenured voting is motivated by policy advocates to reduce short-termism; and antiindexer variations are motivated by policy advocates to negate the arguably ill-informed of
diversified indexers. The rationale of each scheme is binary—a focus on short- or long-term
horizon for dual class and tenured and a focus on relative concentration for the anti-indexer
variations.
It is logical to consider conjoining both long-term and concentrated behavior in a voting
policy that I will call quality voting. It refines tenured voting to account not only for duration but
conviction.
Participants in the debate will have varying responses to a proposal to increase voting
power of both long-term and concentrated shares. But while many skeptics may remain skeptics,
some may see things differently; proponents of one or the other approach may agree or disagree
with quality voting; those who support both may have already come to the same conclusion as this
Article does without having yet contributed it to the literature.
1. Comparing Regimes
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See Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, Md.
L. Rev. (forthcoming).
347

Professor Griffith offers another approach which would compromise based on the type of voting
topic in terms of whether funds have a plausible information advantage compared to their customers,
distinguishing between, for instance, mergers versus social proposals See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In
Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, Texas L. Rev. (2020).
While interesting, this proposal faces the definitional challenge of classifying the type of voting topic as
well as the same issue of rational apathy of the account holders. I concur with the rationale for such an
assertion, which is that funds and many corporate governance experts, overestimate their ability to rank
governance provisions from good to bad on an abstract basis.
Professors Lund and Griffith co-authored another piece advocating an even more interesting
approach to address conflicts of interests that index funds face. Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund,
Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1181-86 (2019). They look at
conflicts arising from mutual fund structures and suggest the solution of excluding their vote in votes
requiring a minimum level of disinterested shares to carry.
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Unlike dual class voting, this remains democratic. It does not inevitably or irremovably
cement control in designated hands, but operates as a fluid advantage that fluctuate as investors
rebalance their portfolios over time in varying weights.
As with tenured voting, quality voting is almost certainly permitted under corporate law—
in fact, one of the two landmark cases in this area, Providence, addressed a plan more akin to
quality voting than to tenured voting (though it was the inverse, capping voting rights of
concentrated shares whereas quality voting would multiply voting rights of concentrated share).
The case under New York Stock Exchange rules remains equivocal but is stronger than for tenured
voting, since the text of the rule expressly refers to “time phased voting plans.”348
Also as with tenured voting, quality voting would be a valuable shareholder cultivation
mechanism. It would probably be of greater effect for the discrete group of quality shareholders.
It would pose less risk than tenured voting of entrenching managers after they decrease ownership
because concentration levels would still be counted. It would pose none of the downside risk of
increasing the voting power of ill-equipped indexers.
As with dual class and tenured voting, the exact terms could be tailored to suit.349 Reliable
references can draw upon the selection criteria used by researchers in identifying the quality
shareholder cohort, all of which is publicly filed with the SEC for most institutional investors and
relatively easy for reasonable investors to determine from their regular records.
As to conviction, examples of such inputs are percentage of a shareholder’s portfolio in the
stock, average stock percentage in the shareholder’s portfolio, and number of other stocks in the
portfolio.350 Companies could access the relevant data bases of scholars who maintain ongoing
records of shareholder quality.351
To illustrate, consider a simple model comparing one-share, one-vote first with tenured
voting and then quality voting. Imagine a simple shareholder base, where the period of ownership
of outstanding shares is about equally distributed among older and newer shareholders and those
in between—such as 33% own for less than one year, more than three years, and in between.
With 99 shares outstanding, each cohort controls 33 votes. No single cohort can command
the outcome of any vote. But if time-weighted voting added three votes to each share held longer
than three years, then that cohort would have 99 votes, the others would still have 33 each and a
combined 66. The seasoned cohort would then dictate the outcome of every vote. But it is not
obvious that such seasoning translates into proportionally greater wisdom for a company.
Time-weighted Voting Power
Duration & Multiple

Normal Votes

< Year = 1x

348

33

Time-weighted Votes
1x = 33

See supra note 326 (quoting the rule).

See supra text accompanying notes 302-305 (noting how dual class can vary voting rights with
the subject matter of the vote, among other ways) and supra text accompanying note 309 (noting how
tenured voting can vary voting power according to duration, multiple, and subject matter of the vote).
349

350

See supra text accompanying notes 56-58 (summarizing the criteria used in Professor Bushee’s

research).
See supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (summarizing the methods and data of both Professor
Cremers and Borochin).
351
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1-3 years = 1x

33

1x = 33

>3 yrs. = 3x

33

3x = 99

That invites consideration of quality voting. To take one of the potential proxies for
conviction, suppose this is shares representing a substantial portion of a shareholders’ portfolio,
measured as a percentage of the shareholders’ total public company equity portfolio. For example,
two votes per share could be granted to shareholders allocating between one percent and five
percent of their portfolio to the company and three votes per share to those allocating more than
five percent. If tenured voting implicitly assumes that longer-held shares cast higher-quality votes,
the hypothesis follows that shares owned by those with greater exposure will also have such merit.
To adjust the previous illustration, suppose portfolio concentration is randomly distributed
across durations. Combining duration with concentration, the short term unconcentrated cohort
would remain entitled to 33 votes while the longest-holding and most-concentrated would enjoy
199 votes. Updating the previous table that showed the effects of duration in tenured voting, This
table adds the effects of concentration.
Quality Voting Power
Duration Multiple

Concentration Multiple

None

< Year = no multiple

< 1% x = no multiple

Some

1-3 years = 2x

1-5% = 2x

Substantial

> 3 years = 3x

> 10% = 3x

The outcome of any vote would be determined by a fluid combination of shareholders
boasting relatively longer durations and higher concentrations. To complete the illustration, the
next table applies the multiples to the previous example of a company with 99 shares outstanding,
with 33 each held for varying durations and concentrations.
Votes Given Combinations of Concentration and Duration
Concentration

< 1% = no multiple

1% to 5% = 2x

>5% = 3x

< 1 year = no multiple

33

66

99

1-3 years = 2x

66

132

165

>3 years = 3x

99

165

198

Duration

Shared area reflects number of votes commanded given concentration and duration levels.

(This example presents the multiples in the proportion of 1-2-3. That is a high magnitude
of change in multiples, which may be too large for comfort in an experimental stage. More modest
multiples could be set, such as 1, 1.33, 1.66 or even 1, 1.2, 1.4.)
2. Pros and Cons
Quality voting can be adopted by charter amendment under state corporation law along
with an application to the stock exchange for a waiver of any restrictions on alternative voting
regimes. In this legal sense, it is akin to dual class or tenured voting—all of which are easier than
the variations of anti-indexer regimes, which would require legal changes and related political
support.
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As with dual class and tenured voting, quality voting enables each company to design the
details and tailor the arrangements to suit in a joint exercise involving solely board and shareholder
approval. Each company must weigh the following costs and benefits of adoption.
Administrative burdens may be high. While the five-year old experience in France suggests
that administration is feasible, the U.S. system has some different features. One problem is how
most U.S. equity is held in the names of depository nominees rather than ultimate owners,
complicating the task of tracking ownership concentration.352 Recordkeeping and calculations can
be complex, especially for large institutions investing through multiple funds, including those with
diverse mixes of debt, equity, and other securities.353
In fact, companies that rescinded tenured voting often cited administrative complexity as a
reason.354 Administering commitment-weighted voting would pose additional cost, particularly in
recordkeeping and verification. For example, duration is a fixed measure of time, whereas
concentration can vary substantially over time.
On the other hand, those maintain tenured voting invoked common solutions. For example,
one common solution to the challenge of street name ownership was to deem street name stock as
low-vote.355 Such an approach could be modified by making that a presumption that each
shareholder would have the right to challenge.
Such a simple approach can be implemented immediately for all shareholders, including
individuals, by shifting the burden of disclosure to the shareholder: any shareholder wishing to
exercise quality shares would be required to submit qualifying evidence to the corporate secretary
accordingly. The corporate secretary can create uniform rules describing what evidence qualifies
and standardized procedures to verify it.
Moreover, holdings are readily observable from public filings for institutional investors
and can be verified by reference to disclosure that is legally required and subject to federal antifraud rules. For these shareholders, enhanced voting power could be made optional and subject to
the company’s confirmation of verified shareholder applications.
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See Edelman, supra note 4, at 297 (drawing on David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The
Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy System and Its Solution, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 41, 50 (2011)). In
brief, before the 1970s, share ownership records were maintained manually in a traditional paper recording
system maintained by individual brokerage firms. Trading volume proved too much for such a system,
however, creating backlogs in updating transfer records. To meet this challenge, the industry developed a
computerized system maintained in a central depository, called the Depository Trust Company (DTC).
Today, the vast majority of stock is held through DTC, with stock formally owned by its nominee, Cede &
Co., and held in the name of the brokerage firm that arranged the purchase (called “street name” on behalf
of the “beneficial” owner).
Corporations must maintain stockholder lists to determine associated rights, on voting and other
matters. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 219(a) (2020). In the process, companies contact DTC to enumerate
the breakdown of brokers holding shares through Cede. The Cede breakdown can be cumbersome, involve
numerous interactions between the company and DTC, and is error-prone. Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at
1004. Such challenges and risks multiply for companies with peculiar voting rules, such as tenured voting,
as this requires additional information such as duration of holdings.
353

354

See Edelman, supra note 4, at n. 89 (quoting Church & Dwight Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form
PRE 14A), at 27 (Mar. 21, 2003)).
355

See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 602.
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Just as technology helped solve the paper crisis, technology is likely again to solve the
street name problem, including the administration of special voting rules. Advances in tracking
technology, particularly digital ledgers based on blockchain tools, promise to make administration
of quality voting manageable. In 2017, Delaware corporate law was amended to permit companies
to use blockchain (or distributed ledgering) to maintain their shareholder lists.356 These enable
digital records showing every transaction involving every share of stock, with precise details of
beneficial rather than street ownership as well as duration and other data.357
In any event, such costs must be compared to the gains. In general, gains can be
approximated by reference to some of the common contexts where suboptimal voting has been
recognized. These would include many of the instances where indexers have conflicts of interest
as well as the legal contexts in which courts have recognized transient shareholder appetites to be
problematic.
Under quality voting, finally, activist shareholders may often gain enhanced power when
they hold meaningful stakes for long periods. Voting power could also increase during the course
of multi-year campaigns, as more votes accrue over time. Both points may attract activists, but
while managers may see some associated costs, they will be activists more patient and focused
than other shareholders, producing comparative gains.
CONCLUSION
Why have quality shareholders, including Warren Buffett, been neglected in the corporate
law scholarship on horizon, conviction and shareholder voting? One possibility is the familiar
difference between theory and practice. Scholars work with theories that may or may not map onto
actual behaviors. A tension sometimes resides between academic and practical perspectives in
scholarly work.358
In corporate law and finance scholarship last generation, for instance, a disconnect
occurred between modern finance theory and Buffett.359 Theorists developed the efficient capital
market hypothesis, capital asset pricing model, and modern portfolio theory as a construct that
contradicted most everything Buffett thought and did—the theorists even suggested he could not
have done what he did.360 The theories being developed in today’s corporate law debates recall a
flavor of that gap, where the light shines on short-term activists and long-term indexers but none
at all on the long-term concentrated, quality shareholder.
As Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues have noted in one of their many major
contributions to the conviction debate, they are putting forward a theory of institutional investor
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2020).
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See Edelman, supra note 4, at 1006 (these tools would be a “great advantage” for tenure
voting to “make it easier for companies to trace the identity of their shareholders and therefore more
accurately assign high and low voting rights”).
358
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 101,
106 (1997) (exploring a theoretical model that has little practical use).
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See Lowenstein, supra note 24, at 934.
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Id. (reviewing finance theory of the era which theorists simply ignored Buffett’s record, wished
it away, or dismissed him as an outlier: “it is odd, is it not, that not one EMT theorist has seen fit to study
Buffett?” and their “response to Buffett has been either a deafening silence or a clumsy attempt to avoid
the engagement.”).
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incentives that predicts impoverished decision making while acknowledging that actual decision
making may be superior to the model.361 Other scholars in this debate likewise theorize and model
without necessarily accounting for all relevant incentives of all the diverse actors, especially
quality shareholders.
“Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory,” Buffett has famously
quipped.362 Quality shareholding works in practice, and requires only slight adjustment to work in
theory. Both theory and practice will be richer when horizon and conviction are combined for
study and the quality shareholder’s role is explored. This Article lights the way.
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Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst 237, at 90:

We recognize that well-meaning investment managers of index funds and active mutual
funds may sometimes make stewardship decisions that are superior to those suggested
purely by their incentive calculus. Our focus, however, is on understanding the structural
incentive problems that should be recognized in assessing the current governance
landscape.
See Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts. 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 683, 685 (2015) (quoting
Buffett’s “famous quip”).
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